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: Enhancing Impunity

TIHE UNITED STATES' ENHANCED IMPUNITY FOR ITS
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS: THE CONTINUED UNLAWFUL
TREATMENT OF CAPTIVES AND DETAINEES FOLLOWING THE
ATTACK OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
David Brennan *
This paper addresses the issue of United States government officials' impunity
during the Bush Administration in actions taken after the September 11, 2001
(9/11) attack and during the "war on terrorism." The footnoted "Principle 1.
General Obligations of States to Take Effective Action to Combat Impunity" is part
of the framework for this inquiry.' The focus is on the actors, practices and the
possible consequences of acting with impunity respecting the United States
international obligations for the detention and treatment of captives. This takes the
considerations of that activity beyond the armed conflict situations in Afghanistan
and Iraq. The two major practices to be considered are: (1) torture, which includes
other cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment (torture); and (2) extraordinary
rendition that involves a forced transfer of a captive or detainee from one detention
facility to another in a different country where the primary intent is administering
extreme, harsh interrogations and mistreatment in locations where the host-country
officials will not interfere with the practices. This secret and opportunistic use of
remote facilities in foreign states bypasses the essential fact that they violate
recognized norms of the international laws of war and humanitarian and human
rights law, to which the United States ascribes.
This paper considers the deliberate steps taken by the current administration
since January 2009 to continue this pattern of impunity by providing forms of nearamnesty for those who ordered, planned and implemented the practices of torture
or rendition in the post-9/1 1 era.2 Further, none of the detainees who were
subjected to prolonged detention, torture or rendition were afforded the required
redress or compensation for the violations of international law, despite the United
*
David Brennan is a Professor of Law at the University of San Diego School of Law,
http://www.sandiego.edullaw/academics/faculty/bio.php?id=854.
1.
U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Sixty-First Session, U.N. ESCOR, 61st Sess., Doc.
E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 (2005), available at http://daccess-dds ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/GO5/109/00/
PDF/G0510900.pdf?OpenElement.

Arises from a failure by States to meet their obligations to investigate violations; to take
appropriate measures in respect of the perpetrators, particularly in the area of justice, by
ensuring that those suspected of criminal responsibility are prosecuted, tried and duly
punished; to provide victims with effective remedies and to ensure that they receive
reparation for the injuries suffered; to ensure the inalienable right to know the truth about
the violations; and to take other necessary steps to prevent a recurrence of violations.
Id.
2.

See LEVIN, infra note 133.
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States' obligations to provide it.3 The U.S. courts rejected the claims or grounds for
redress in some cases while the Justice Department has vigorously, albeit
successfully, opposed remedies for the detainees who were victims of rendition or
torture.4 I argue that this pattern of conduct, if continued, undermines the United
States' attempt to regain its position as the de facto leader of the free world in
advocating for the rule of law and adherence by other states to their international
obligations.
I. INTRODUCTION

The unprecedented September 11, 2001 attack resulted in dramatic and
profound changes in the government's approach to fighting in a new conflict that
was declared a "war on terrorism," which profoundly impacted the day-to-day
activities of everyone from the President of the United States to all of its citizens.
The attack's scope of destruction of humans and property inflicted a catastrophic
effect not only on the citizens of the United States, but also on the entire global
community. 6 It was unique because a non-state group, the followers of Al Qaeda,
rather than a government or other legitimately recognized international entity,
perpetrated the attack, which required entirely different responses and strategies to
address the perpetrators and followers to prevent another attack.7 In contrast to the
December 7, 1941 surprise attack on Pearl Harbor by Japanese military forces,
neither the Taliban nor Al Qaeda were acting with recognized uniform military
forces in carrying out their attacks; 9/11 did not provide the United States with a
defined enemy to engage against on a field of battle with traditional military
forces.9
The 9/11 event was not the first protracted engagement by the United States
military forces with insurgencies, the most recent being the Viet Cong during the

3.
See Laura N. Pennelle, The Guantanamo Gap: Can Foreign Nationals Obtain Redress for Prolonged
Arbitrary Detention and Torture Suffered Outside the United States?, 36 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 303, 309 (2006)
(concluding that "no clear avenue currently exists by which innocent foreign national detainees may obtain
adequate redress for their alleged human rights violations").
4.
See H.R. REP. No. 110-844 (September 18, 2008) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT OF 2008].
5.

THE 9/11 COMM. REPORT-FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS

UPON THE UNITED STATES 39, 330-34 (2004) [hereinafter THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT], available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edul911/report/91 I Report.pdf.
6.
Id.
7.

See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERTERRORISM (2011),

available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism-strategy.pdf.
President Obama
confirmed that ten years later "[d]espite our successes, we continue to face a significant terrorist threat from [Al
Qaeda], its affiliates and its adherents ... [who] have shown themselves to be agile and adaptive ... [requiring]
that we develop and pursue a strategy". . . to meet that capacity. Id. at foreword.
8.
Remembering Pearl Harbor, U.S. DEPT. OF DEF., http://www.defense.gov/home/features/pearl harbor/
(last visited Mar. 1, 2013).
9.
See U.S. ARMY & U.S. MARINE CORPS, The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual
6-8 (2007) [hereinafter COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL] ("Today's operational environment ... includes a
new kind of insurgency, one that seeks to impose revolutionary change worldwide. Al Qaeda is a well known
example of such an insurgency.").
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Vietnam War which ended in 1975.1o Following the brief Spanish-American war
of 1898, the United States military battled an insurgency in the Philippines, where
insurgency leaders opposed the United States." The United States military
remained as an occupier of the country, resulting in several years of conflict
between the two forces.1 2 Unfortunately, the conflict was marked by significant
atrocities by United States military forces that were perpetrated on the country's
civilian population during the military's efforts to identify and eliminate the
insurgency, and included a practice called "waterboarding."l 3 This practice, later
outlawed by President Theodore Roosevelt, would become a form of torture
administered to detainees at Guantinamo a century later.14 The frequency of the
application of waterboarding in the Philippines resulted in numerous deaths, and
accompanied other brutality inflicted on the civilian populations during the
conflicts.' 5 The brutalities resulted in lengthy Congressional hearings to determine
the nature of the practices and the responsibility for them.' 6 Decades later,
waterboarding was sporadically applied to suspected Viet Cong insurgents by
United States military forces, but the practice violated United States military law,
so perpetrators who were reported were subject to prosecution under the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).'

Maddy Sauer, Vic Walter & Rich Esposito, History of an Interrogation Technique: Waterboarding,
10.
ABC NEWS, (Nov. 29, 2005) [hereinafter Sauer], http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/Investigation/storyid=1356870;
see Richard Schultz, The Limits of Terrorismin Insurgency Warfare: The Case ofthe Viet Cong, 11 POLITY 79-82
(No. 1, Autumn, 1978); see Robert F. Turner, Myths of the Vietnam War-The Pentagon Papers Reconsidered, 7
SOUTHEAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVES 48-52 (Sept. 1972).

i1.

Evan Wallach, Drop by Drop: Forgettingthe History of Water Torture in the U.S. Courts, 45 COLUM.

J. TRANSNAT'L L. 468, 495-501 (2007).

Id
12.
Id.
13.
14.
See Sauer, supra note 10; Court-Martial of Major Edwin F. Glenn, Samar, P.I. (reprinted in LEON
FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 814 (1972)). This practice was seemingly
administered to hundreds if not thousands of suspected insurgents with resulting severe injuries and many deaths.
See generally Frank Schumacher, "Marked Severities ": The Debate over Torture during America's Conquest of
the Philippines, 1899-1902, 51 AMERIKASTUDIEN/AM.

STUD. 475 (2006) (Ger.); see also Jeffrey B. Sacco,

Waterboarding: An American Dilemma 3 (U. Neb. Unpublished article, 2010) available at
http://144.216.1.137/uploadedFiles/academics/gradstudies/ssrp/Sacco.pdf ("Water boarding was outlawed by
President Theodore Roosevelt after its media disclosure following the Spanish-American War in 1901 ....
);
Leonard Doyle, CIA Waterboarding 'Broke Suspect after 35 Seconds', INDEP. (Dec. 12, 2007) available at
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/cia-waterboarding-broke-suspect-after-35-seconds764595.html (reporting by a former CIA agent of the breaking of Abu Zubaida by waterboarding at Guantinamo);
see Memorandum from Lieutenant Colonel Diane E. Beaver for Commander, Joint Task Force 170, Legal Brief on
Proposed Counter-Resistance Strategies (Oct. 11, 2002) [hereinafter Lt. Col. Beaver Memo of Oct. 11, 2002],
available at http://www.defense.gov/news/jun2004/d20040622doc3.pdf (confirming the legal authorization for the
use of "wet towels for inducing a sensation of suffocating in interrogations" as permissible at Guantinamo).
See Sauer,supra note 10.
15.
16.
See Wallach, supranote 12.
17.
See generally Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) art. 18, 10 U.S.C. § 886 (2008).
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1I. RESPONSES TO THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF 9/11
On September 12, 2001, President Bush sought Congressional approval for the
use of military force against the attackers.'" He presented a draft of an
authorization for the use of military force (AUMF) that was quickly approved by
Congress.9 Two weeks later, military actions commenced in AfghanistanOperation Enduring Freedom-based on that country being the source of some of
the Al Qaeda operatives who planned and executed the 9/11 attack.20 President
Bush then issued a new military order-The Detention, Treatment and Trial of
Certain Non-Citizens in The War Against Terrorism (DTA)-which is germane
here because of its recognized disregard for accepted norms of humanitarian law
that formed part of existing United States military policy and law governing the
armed forces' conduct involving captives. 2 1 These and other steps by the
administration's top officials were precursors to more actions that sidestepped the
United States international humanitarian law obligations embodied in recognized
conventions and agreements to which it was a party, and thereby manifested a
significant degree of impunity towards those obligations.
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS AT THE TIME OF THE 9/11 ATTACK

A. Required Treatment for Detainees and Captives
The United States' first published set of rules for the conduct of war was the
Civil War era Lieber Code, which embodied basic principles for the treatment of
captives and detainees.22 The Lieber Code stated that: "Military necessity does not
admit of cruelty-that is, the infliction of suffering for the sake of suffering or for
revenge . . . nor of torture to exhort confessions." 2 3 Four decades after The Lieber
Code's introduction in the United States, the international community meetings at
18.
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) [hereinafter
AUMF], available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22357.pdf.
19.
Id. (authorizing the President "to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons [linked to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States] . . . ."). It would be later
argued that the authorization provided him with absolute blanket authority "to deter and prevent acts of terrorism
against United States," a somewhat broader interpretation of the actual language of the AUMF. See RICHARD F.
GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22357, AUTHORIZATION FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE IN RESPONSE

To
THE 9/11
ATTACK
(P. L. 107-40):
LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY
4-5
(2007),
available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22357.pdf.
20.
President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation to Mark the Beginning of Allied Attacks on Terrorist
Targets in Afghanistan (Oct. 7, 2001), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/combating/bush_107.html.
21.
Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918, reprinted in 10 U.S.C. § 801 (Supp. IV, 2001) (subjecting the Al Qaeda
members and other foreign nationals to "military tribunals," while simultaneously depriving the captives from any
relief or remedy available to them in the courts the of United States). This unprecedented order's intent was to
deprive the Article Ill Courts of their constitutional jurisdiction over the cases involving any detainees. Subsequent
U.S. Supreme Court decisions would nullify this unauthorized exercise of executive power despite the claims of
war or crisis to justify the measures. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 476 (2004).
22.
Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, supra note 21
23.

THE LIEBER CODE: INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE

FIELD, GENERAL ORDERS, NO. 100, art. 16 (1863).
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The Hague, in which the United States military representatives participated, drafted
the Hague Convention (No. IV) 1907 (Hague IV) that modernized the core
principle of the laws of war on the subject of captives and stated "that [p]risoners
of war[,] .

.

. combatants and noncombatants[,] .

.

. must be humanely treated." 24

Many of Hague IV's principles were not adhered to by some of the major powers
during the four years of World War I-a fact that is not surprising considering the
historical war paradigms' disregard for the rule of law during crises.2 5
The next important instrument relative to the treatment of detainees was the
1929 Geneva Convention's provisions addressing the treatment of prisoners of war
by the obligation: (1) to have respect for their persons; and (2) to understand that
prisoners were not required to give their captors information beyond "his true
names and rank, or his regimental number[,]" after capture.26 Additionally,
prisoners could not be "[pressured] to obtain information regarding the situation in
their armed forces[;]" 2 7 all lawful obligations that were not provided to the
detainees at GuantAinamo or other United States controlled facilities during the war
on terror.
IV. UNITED STATES OBLIGATIONS RE: DETAINEES POST

9/11

In 2001, the United States was a signatory and bound to other major postWorld War II international instruments that obligated State parties to refrain from
certain acts, and to provide captives, whether prisoners of war or civilians, with
certain protections. These were delineated in major instruments that included: The
Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 (I-IV) (Geneva Conventions of 1949),28
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment 1984 (CAT), 2 9 and the International Convention on Civil
and Political Rights of 1967 (ICCPR).30 Each of these three instruments addressed
the treatment of captives and detainees who would be held by the United States
24.
Hague Convention of 1907 No. IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, and Annex,
arts. 3-4, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. 539.
25.

OMER BARTOV, ATINA GROSSMANN & MARY NOLAN, CRIMES OF WAR: GUILT AND DENIAL IN THE

TWENTIETH

CENTURY

(2002),

available

at

http://tiwanakuarcheo.net/KwMsGr2011/2%20-

%20Neier/20Crimes%/200%20War%20War/20and/20War/20Crimes%20A/20Brief/20History%20

-

7.pdf (quoting John Keegan); see generally L.C. Green, Cicero and Clausewitz or Quincy Wright: The Interplay of
Law and War, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 59 (1998), available at http://www.usafa.edu/df/dfl/documents
/JLS%20Volume%209/greenpdf (on the Cicero maxim "silent enim leges inter armes" (the law is silent during
war)).
26.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, 5, Jan. 27, 1929 [hereinafter
Geneva Conventions 1929], availableat http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsflFULlU305?OpenDocument.
27.
Id. at art. 60-62. Standing alone these three articles describe a required process for prisoners'
notification of any charges against them and adequate representation, none of which was available during the early
stages of Guantinamo or at other military detention facilities. Id
28.
The 1949 Geneva Conventions 1-IV, 75 U.N.T.S. 35-417 (Eng. Fr.) [hereinafter Geneva Conventions
of 1949]; 999 U.N. T.S. 171; 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967).
Convention Against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1465
29.
U.N.T.S. 85 (1984) [hereinafter CAT]; G.A. Res. 46 (XXXIX) (1984) (Annex); 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1985) (as
modified, 24 I.L.M. 535) (1985);
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights in 1967, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967)
30.
[hereinafter ICCPR].
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forces.3 1 The Geneva Conventions of 1949 III & IV (Geneva III and Geneva IV)
principles were directly incorporated into the US military's Law of Land Warfare
in 1956 in the United States' Department of the Army Field Manual, (FM 27-10).32
Geneva IV includes special provisions for protecting civilians, including those who
did not qualify for treatment under the "prisoner of war" status. 3 FM 27-10's
mandate from Geneva III and IV was: "no physical or mental torture, nor any other
form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them
information of any kind whatever." 3 4 The United States Army's Intelligence
Interrogation Field Manual (FM 34-52) was introduced in 1992 for use by military
personnel during interrogations." It was directed to the treatment of both prisoners
of war and captured insurgents and invoked the same prohibitions under the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 against unlawful treatment by specifically defining
physical torture as "infliction of intense pain to body or mind to extract a
confession or information, or for sadistic pleasure."36
This paper addresses the fact that President Bush and other senior officials
would refuse to accept these international law prohibitions delineated above, but
instead would employ the designation of "unlawful combatant" or "unlawful
enemy combatant" for Al Qaeda and Taliban detainees to justify modifying the
United States' obligations under Geneva III and IV and the Laws of War-a
decision and expression of considerable impunity towards lawful and binding
obligations.37 If the treatment of detainees reached the level of torture under the
CAT, any claimed "exception" would likewise be ineffective because the
prohibitions in the CAT and the Geneva Conventions of 1949 are recognized under
principles of international law as norms of a jus cogens nature, meaning that no
state party may derogate from them under general principles of international law.3
In The Shape of Modern Torture, Parry notes the folly of practicing this kind of
exceptionalism to preemptive norms, because "[t]he danger is that the state of

31.
Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 28; CAT, supranote 29; ICCPR, supranote 30.
32.
See generally THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, FM 27-10, July 1956 [hereinafter FM 27-101.
33.
Geneva Conventions of 1949 IV, supranote 28, at art. 246-48.
34.
Id. at art. 93.
35.
U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION, FM 34-52, 28, Sept. 1992 [hereinafter FM 34-52].
36.
Id. at 1.7-1.9. The army interrogation methods did not reduce the applications of the Geneva
Conventions to "other categories" of detainees. Id.
37.
Memorandum from the President on the Humane Treatment of Taliban and Al Qaeda Detainees, (Feb.
7, 2002) [hereinafter Bush Memo of Feb. 7, 2002], available at http://www.pegc.us/archive/WhiteHouse/
bush memo_20020207_ed.pdf. This decision was predicated on memorandums from his White House Counsel,
Alberto Gonzales. See Memorandum for the President by Alberto Gonzales, Re: Decision re: Application of the
Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002) [hereinafter
Gonzales Memo to President of Jan. 25, 2002], available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBBI27/02.01.25.pdf.
38.
CAT, supra note 29, art. 2.1, 2.2; Geneva Conventions of 1949 IV, supra note 28, at art. 32, 147;
ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 445-46 (2d ed. 2005); INGRID DETTER, THE LAW OF WAR 71 (2d ed.
2000); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 329, 331, 537-38 (7th ed. 2003). Brownlee

recognizes that the "State violates intemational law, if, as a matter of state policy it practices, encourages or
condones ... torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Id.
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exception will become the norm."39 Likewise, he also recognizes the difficulty in
"finding an absolute purely constitutional right to not be tortured." 0 The Fourth,
Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution do not
expressly prohibit torture.41 The Eighth Amendment prevents only the "infliction
of cruel and unusual punishment," but without a clear definition provided with the
prohibition.4 2
In contemporary international law, the ICCPR's Article 7 incorporates the
CAT's prohibition of torture for acts constituting "torture, cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment." 3 Article 4 of the ICCPR permits State parties,
"[i]n times of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the
existence of which is officially proclaimed . . . [to] take measures derogating from

their obligations under the [convention]"; however, the permission is limited "to
the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation[.]"" Based on the
examination of the international instruments in this paper coupled with the
measures that were inflicted on many detainees, the practices of the United States
grossly exceeded the "strictly required" language of the ICCPR's Article 4.45 The
described unlawful treatment amounted to torture on hundreds of detainees,
including the practice of frequent and repetitive waterboarding.46 The Director of
the United States Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Michael D.
Maples, testified before the United States Senate Armed Services Committee in
2008 that "in his view, waterboarding violated the laws of war.' 7 After World War
II, Japanese officers and enlisted men were tried and severely punished before the
International Military Tribunal Far East (IMTFE) for crimes against humanity
related to ordering or conducting waterboarding on captives. 4 8 Illegal and clearly a

39.
John T Parry, The Shape of Modern Torture: ExtraordinaryRendition and Ghost Detainees, MELB. J.
INT'L. 516, 523 (2005) (pointing to "Weimar Republic's proclamation of a state of emergency, more than 250
times over a period of 13 years").
40.
Id at 527-28. Parry focuses on the fact that the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth amendments to the
U.S. Constitution do not provide a bright line rule on the question of torture. Id. However, the doctrine from
Washington v. Gluksburg relating to treatment that "shocks the conscience" allows for too much leeway and the
likelihood of coercive interrogation. Id. at 527-28; see Washington v. Gluksburg, 521 US 83, 849 (1998).
41.
U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V, Vill & XIV.
Id
42.
43.
ICCPR,supra note 30, art. 7. Article 9 prohibits arbitrary arrest or detention and includes the obligation
to promptly inform anyone arrested of the charges against him. Id. at art. 9.
44.
Id. at art. 4. This permissive language is tempered with the constraint on State parties that "such
measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law. . . ." Id. Furthermore, article 4,
section 2 prohibits any derogation from articles 6, 7 and 8. Id.
45.
Id.
46.
Office of the U.N. High Comm. on Human Rights, The Istanbul Protocol: Manual on Effective
Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(2004) (a prominent set of international guidelines for the documentation of torture and its consequences); Office
of the U.N. High Comm. on Human Rights, E.OIXIV, Training Manual on Human Rights Monitoring, E.OIXIV
(1999) ("[N]ear asphyxiation by suffocation is an increasingly common method of torture."). The protocol goes on
to describe its wide use in Latin America under the name "submarino." Id
47.
Testimony of LTG Michael Maples, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, before the U.S.
Senate armed services committee, "annual threat assessment," Feb. 27, 2008, at 31, available at
http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/2-0080227_transcript.pdf.
48.
Wallach, supra note 12, at 472, 478-94.
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war crime long before the 9/11 attack, it remained so regardless of the aggressive
efforts to repudiate the prohibition against it.4 9
The obligations of State parties to prisoners of war under the Geneva
Convention of 1949 require, during times of war or conflict, that State parties
refrain from all forms of violence or mistreatment of prisoners of war and civilian
captives.5o Each of the four Geneva Conventions included a "Common Article 3"
(Common Article 3) that binds parties to provide certain minimum protections for
captives, and specifically, "prohibits at any time and in any place whatsoever with
respect to the above-mentioned persons: (a) violence to life . . . cruel treatment and
torture; . . . (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and

degrading treatment." 5 ' Common Article 3's similar language applicable to those
who are neither prisoners of war nor civilians states: "[T]he following acts are and
shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the
above-mentioned persons," creating another obligation of State parties that would
be violated by engaging in overt acts "of violence to life and person . . . cruel

treatment and torture."52
The CAT's Article 1 defines "torture" in part as "any act by which severe pain
or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for
such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession.
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind.

. . ."5

The proscriptive language in Geneva III and IV

and the CAT's section 2 (2) voids the ability of a state to resort to exceptionalism
to justify forms of torture, irrespective of the fact that it is based on the nature of
the conflict, or the source of the authority or orders for the administration of torture
to any captives.54 The United States became a party to the CAT in 1994, after
Congress enacted a domestic statute that criminalized violations of the CAT and
made it applicable to "all persons, military, civilian or others who violate its
prohibitions."55 This domestic statute has yet to be invoked by the Department of
49.
CAT, supra note 29, at art. 1.
50.
Geneva Conventions of 1949 III, supra note 28. Article 3, section 1 requires that "[piersons taking no
active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed
hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely.
This. includes the prohibitions in Article 3 under subsection (a) "violence to life and person, in particular
murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular,
humiliating and degrading treatment. . . ." Id. Likewise Geneva Convention IV's article 3, sections (a) and (c)
contain identical provisions. Id Cony. IV, art. 3.
51.
Id at Common art. 3.
52.
Id. at Common art. 3, § I and 1(a).
53.
CAT, supranote 29, at art. 1.
54.
Id. at art. 2, §2. The article applies the "no [exceptionalism]" rule regardless of "whether a state of war
or a threat of war, internal political [instability] or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification
of torture." Id. Further, article 2, section 3 avoids the use of superior authority or orders as a justification for
torture. Id at art. 2, § 3.
55.
18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-40B. Under section 2340A(a) any person
outside the United States who commits or attempts to commit torture [is subject to a fine or
imprisonment] . . . (b) [establishes the] jurisdiction over the activity . . . if (1) the alleged

offender is a national of the United States; or (2) the alleged offender is present in the
United States, irrespective of the nationality of the victim or the alleged offender.
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Justice in charges or for the prosecution of any individuals responsible for violating
its provisions for the treatment of detainees. There have been few military actions
taken under the UCMJ against military personnel for violations of that military
law.
V. PROHIBITIONS ON THE PRACTICE OF EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION

The recognized process of extraditing offenders to and from foreign countries
by the United States is governed generally by 18 U.S.C. section 3181.57 The
processes required for conducting extraditions are found in section 3184; none of
which were utilized by officials for the transfer of any detainees during the war on
terrorism.5 8 According to a Congressional Research Service Report (CRS Report
2010), extradition "is triggered by a request submitted through diplomatic
channels."5 9 The request "proceeds to the Department of Justice and State and may
be presented to a federal magistrate to order a hearing to determine whether the
Although this process has
request is in compliance with an applicable treaty. ."6
a required transparency and judicial oversight to protect the individual subject to it,
there is no place in the process for "secret extraordinary rendition." The CRS
Report 2010 states that the provisions of the CAT are applicable and require that its
provisions must also be taken into consideration because of its prohibition that "no
State Party 'shall expel, return . . . or extradite a person to another State where
there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture.'" 6 After the ratification of the CAT in 1994, Congress enacted
specific legislation "which required all relevant federal agencies to adopt
appropriate regulations to implement this policy" in the Foreign Affairs and
Reform and Restructuring Act (FARRA).62 The United States military and Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) would have been obvious "agencies" under this
enactment obligated to comply with it.63
CAT's Article 3 language absolutely prohibits transferring captives or
prisoners to other locations where they may be subjected to harsher interrogations

Id. The domestic statute did not create a specific 'private right of action' for individuals who were victims of the
prohibited practices. See 18 U.S.C. § 2340B.
See Office of the Secretary of Defense, Detainee Files/SASC Church Hearing-Review of the Dep't of
56.
Defense Detention Operations and Detainee Interrogation Techniques, VADM A.T. Church, III, U.S. Navy,
available at http://www.aclu.org/images/torture/asset upload file625 26068.pdf [hereinafter Church Report].
Extradition: Scope and Limitation of Chapter, 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (2006).
57.
58.
Fugitives from Foreign Country to United States, 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (2006).
59.
MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA AND CHARLES DOYLE, EXTRADITION To AND FROM THE UNITED STATES:
OVERVIEW OF THE LAW AND RECENT TREATIES, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, Summary 19-25 (Mar. 17, 2010)

[hereinafter CRS REPORT OF 2010], available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/98-958.pdf.
60.
Id. at 24.
61.
CAT, supranote 29, at art. 3; CRS REPORT OF 2010, supra note 59, at 24.
62.
CRS REPORT OF 2010, supra note 59, at 24; see Foreign Affairs and Reform and Restructuring Act of
1998 P.L. 105 277 § 2422; 112 Stat. 2681-822 (1998) [hereinafter Foreign Affairs & Reform Act].
63.
Foreign Affairs & Reform Act, supra note 62.
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than would occur in a domestic setting. 4 This prohibition is echoed in the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and the ICCPR so we need to determine whether or not
United States officials used the practice of extraordinary rendition where it "was
likely to result in severe violence to the detainee incidental to his interrogation at
the other location."65 It is already apparent that the government avoided using 18
U.S.C. section 3181 processes for any detainee.66
The Bush Administration did not originate the practice of rendition.6 7 It was
already being practiced by the United States during the Clinton administration, and
was authorized for "the rendition of seventy or more terrorist[s] to other
jurisdictions around the world" according to CIA Director George Tenet's
testimony before Congress in October 2002.68 The CRS Report of 2010
acknowledges that "Irregular Rendition/Abduction," a practice supposedly "not
frequently employed by the United States, is at the lowest level" for obtaining
fugitives or offenders.6 The Report's comment is interesting given their
documentation of the "controversy over the use of renditions by the United States"
during the recent Bush administration, but the CRS researchers found "little
publicly available information from government sources" regarding the actual
rendition practices."70 The United States is a party to extradition treaties with a
majority of foreign states. 7 1 The United States has no comparable extradition treaty,
however, with either Syria or Libya, both of which may have provided
*
72
interrogation sites for rendition -detainees.
VI. THE LAWS OF WAR APPLICABLE TO TORTURE

& RENDITION

Ingrid Detter's seminal work on the laws of war describes laws as "the body of
rules which govern relationships in war." 7 3 These rules include the applications of
humanitarian law-which regulate the conduct of war together with human rights
64.
CAT, supra note 29, at art. 3. This article's language using the terms "expel, return, refouler, or
extradite" precludes any legality for the United States or other States practices of rendition of detainees that were
conducted during the Bush era presidency. Id. (emphasis added).
65.
Geneva Conventions of 1949, Cony. III, supra note 28; CAT, supra note 29, at art. 3; ICCPR, supra
note 30.
66.
28 U.S.C. § 3181.
67.
John C. Duncan, Jr., A Hypothetical Postulatefor the Polemic of ExtraordinaryRendition Vis-b- Vis the
Paradigm of Asymmetrical Warfare, 27 CONN. J. INT'L L. 77, 80, 87 (chronicling the steps taken by Michael
Scheuer, a CIA official, to establish a new policy during the Clinton administration); see also Jane Mayer,
Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America's Extraordinary Rendition Program, THE NEW YORKER
(Feb. 14, 2005), at 106, available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/10/30/061030ta-talk mayer.
68.
Joint Investigation into September 11: Ninth Public Hearing, Statement for the Record of the Director
of Central Intelligence before the J. Inquiry Comm. 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of George J. Tenet, CIA
Director), availableat http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_hr/I 01 702tenet.html.
69.
CRS REPORT OF 2010, supranote 59.
70.
Id at 33-34. Despite this benign comment in the CRS report, the authors concede that the practice
would constitute "violation[s] of both CAT and U.S. criminal law for a U.S. official to conspire to commit torture
via rendition." Id. at 34. CRS authors also cite to the domestic statute implementing the CAT, 18 U.S.C. §
2340A(a) (which criminalizes an offense to conspire to commit torture outside the United States). Id. at 34 n.168.
71.
CRS REPORT OF 2010, supranote 59, at 35-42.
72.
Id. at app. B.
73.
DETTER, supranote 38, at 159.
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law, though humanitarian law is limited in scope to the treatment of civilians,
prisoners of war, wounded or other persons, providing certain minimum standards
of protection for them and avoiding the aggravation of any already inflicted
injuries.74 On paper, the United States incorporated these general principles of the
laws of war in the FM 27-10, and included the required Hague 1907 and Geneva
Conventions of 1949 principles to armed conflicts, including those involving
insurgencies, by the specific admonition to the military establishment that "soldiers
and Marines do not kill or torture enemy prisoners of war" and "treat all civilians
humanely."
Independent of the nature of the conflict at the time of the 9/11 attack, the
President's AUMF did not propose changing how the United States military forces
and its allies should invoke the laws of war obligations under international
humanitarian law in the treatment of detainees and prisoners. 6 The AUMF
provided no language for Congress or military officials to authorize substantial
deviations from the body of humanitarian law accepted by the United States.
Neither the President nor top military officials sought to either suspend or modify
the FM 27-10 provisions, including the Geneva Conventions of 1949 admonitions
and requirements, in the fully operational guide for military personnel in practices
under the laws of war and the protections that were to be applied to detainees.
Without considering the FM 27-10 guidelines for the military, or the laws of
war expressed in them, the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (DOJ
OLC) attorneys Jay S. Bybee and John Yoo, advocated for and provided legal
opinions to top government officials in support of extreme interrogation techniques
and detainee treatment by contending that the detainees in the war on terrorism
were outside the scope of the CAT and the Geneva Conventions of 1949.79 These
and other DOJ OLC officials would provide the legal "cover" for the practices of
Id. at 160-61. Detter's perspective is that the "human rights" aspect in war would be expressed in the
74.
ICCPR, that permits derogation from a focus on human rights during times of emergency, but only when it is on
such a scale that it "threatens the life of the nation," adding that it also "express[es] a condition of proportionality"
that would be applicable. Id. at 161.
COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 9, at 351; DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,
75.
app. J, at J-1 to J-2 (2004), available at
OPERATIONS FMI 3-07.22
COUNTERINSURGENCY

http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fni3-07-22.pdf.
AUMF, supra note 18. There is no language that expressly or impliedly suggests that the existing laws
76.
of war and United States obligations under international law under existing conventions agreements or treaties
may be suspended by virtue of the language in the brief congressional enactment. Id. Rather, the language invokes
the President's power "under the Constitution to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the
United States." Id.
Id.
77.
Church Report, supra note 56, at 33-34.
78.
Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, then Assistant Att'y Gen. to John Rizzo, Acting Gen. Counsel for the
79.
CIA (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Bybee Memo to Rizzo of Aug. 1, 2002], available at
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/0208.01.pdf. Bybee's memorandum reviewed various
interrogation techniques: walling, sleep deprivation, slapping, confinement in a box and others, which he
ultimately opined would not violate 18 U.S.C. section 2340 because "an individual must have the specific intent to
inflict severe pain or suffering. Because specific intent is an element of the offense, the absence of specific intent
negates the charge of torture." Id. at 16. Bybee left the Justice Department in 2004 after confirmation of his
appointment as an appellate judge in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals where he remains today. The Honorable
Jay S. Bybee, Senior Fellow, U. OF NEv. LAS VEGAS, https://law.unlv.edu/faculty/jay-bybee.html (last visited Sept.
23, 2012).
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extraordinary rendition of detainees during the post 9/11 era.80 Those DOJ OLC
opinions were thoroughly discredited more recently in a report by the Office of
Inspector General of the Department of Justice (OIG DOJ) and ultimately
withdrawn from further legal effect, but not until the opinions had generated almost
a decade of legal support for unlawful interrogations and rendition."
VII. ACTING WITH IMPUNITY TO THE UNITED STATES' INTERNATIONAL
OBLIGATIONS

A. The President of the United States-George W. Bush
The President of the United States is the highest elected constitutional officer
and is bound to uphold both the Constitution and the laws of the United States
under the "Take Care Clause" of the Constitution.82 The laws of the United States
include international treaties and agreements to which a country becomes bound.
Many treaties and agreements have been recognized as the "Laws of Nations" since
the inception of our democracy.84 After the 9/11 attack, President Bush sought
many legal opinions that would enable the administration to ignore the obligations
of these international agreements and conventions, including the prevailing "Laws
of War" as to the Al Qaeda and the Taliban groups.85 He secured the desired
"legal" opinions based on faulty analysis or incorrect conclusions, which enabled
him to issue his February 7, 2002 memo undertaking policies that circumscribed
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 obligation to detainees, tempered by his statement
to somehow "treat detainees humanely and to the extent appropriate and consistent
with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva."
80.
2010).

Michael Scharf, The Torture Lawyers, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 389, 390-400, 402-03 (2009-

81.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY REP. INVESTIGATION INTO THE
OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL'S MEMORANDA CONCERNING ISSUES RELATING TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY'S USE OF "ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES" ON SUSPECTED TERRORISTS 235-36 (July 9,2010)

[hereinafter DOJ-OPR Report], available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/OPRFinalReportO9O729.pdf.
Jack Goldsmith, who replaced Jay S. Bybee, did not remove the Bybee August 1, 2002 opinion to CIA's Rizzo,
but it was eventually withdrawn in 2009 by a Department of Justice Order that withdrew it together with several
other similar memos. Memorandum from David J. Barron, Assistant Attorney General, on Withdrawal of Office of
Legal Counsel CIA Interrogation Opinions to the Attorney General (Apr. 15, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/olc/2009/withdrawalofficelegalcounsel.pdf.
82.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
83.
Id.
84.
Id.; see THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, at 37-38 (John Jay) (Random House ed., 1982). The "Take Care
Clause" obligates the president to "take care that the laws be faithfilly executed. . . ." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see
Emmerich deVattel & Joseph Chitty, The Law ofNations, in THE LAWS OF NATIONS: OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW
OF NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS § 3 (T. & J.W. Johnson &

Co. ed., 1883), available at http://www.constitution.org/vattel/vattel.htm.
85.
Gonzales Memo to President of Jan. 25, 2002, supra note 37.
86.
See Letter from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen. to Alberto B. Gonzales, Counsel to the
President (Aug.
1, 2002)
[hereinafter
Yoo
Letter
of Aug.
1, 2002],
available at
http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memo-gonzales-augl.pdf; Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen.,
Re: Status of Taliban Forces Under Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, to Alberto R. Gonzales,
Counsel to the President (Feb. 7, 2002) [hereinafter Bybee Memo to Gonzales of Feb. 7, 2002], available at
http://www.justice.gov/olc/2002/pub-artc4potusdetermination.pdf. In a final review of the independent panel
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The "military necessity" premise for these deviations was untenable under the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 or the CAT.8 7 Later, the administration took the
position that the ICCPR had no application to events occurring outside of the
United States. President Bush would repeatedly advise the public after questions
about the treatment of the detainees at Guantanamo with his oft-stated, "We do not
torture."89
In 2006, President Bush would again express a strong defense of the
interrogation practices when he ordered a sudden transfer of the fourteen high-level
detainees from a foreign "secret site" where they had been subject to substantial
torture to Guantanamo, stating "the prisons were a vital tool in the war on terror
and the intelligence gathered had saved lives[,] . . . the CIA treated detainees
humanely and did not use torture . . . [and] all suspects would be afforded

protection under the Geneva conventions."90 These expressions border on the
absurd in light of the reports on their treatment that would emerge after the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) interviews of some of the
fourteen detainees.91
President Bush never retreated from these positions that were carried out by his
Secretary of Defense, CIA Director, and others, and he continued to defend those
policies after the release of the previously secret OLC memorandums that approved
the practice of waterboarding. 9 2 His deliberate authorization for harsh
addressed to the Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Presidential Chief of
Staff, CIA Director, and National Security Advisor, the President's position was that:
[Nione of the provisions of Geneva apply to our conflict with Al Qaeda in Afghanistan or
elsewhere . . . I have the authority under the Constitution to suspend Geneva . . . common

article 3 of Geneva does not apply to either Al Qaeda or Taliban detainees ... I determine
that the Taliban detainees are unlawful combatants and, therefore, do not qualify as
prisoners of war under article 4 of Geneva.
Bush Memo of Feb. 7, 2002, supranote 37, at 2.
87.
Bush Memo of Feb. 7, 2002, supra note 37, at 2. The memorandum notes that the United States will
"hold states, organizations, and individuals who gain control of United States personnel responsible for treating
such personnel humanely and consistent with applicable law." Id. at 2. In the author's opinion, this statement is at
odds with the manner in which the detainees would be treated in light of the level of impunity asserted as to
Geneva by the President in the case of detainees.
Paula Kweskin, Taiyyaba Qureshi & Marianne Two, The International Legal Landscape of
88.
Extraordinary Renditions: U.S. Obligations under ICCPR, CAT, and the Nuremberg Principles, 20-21, U.N.C.
at
PUB.,
available
CLINIC
POL'Y
RTS.
HUM.
L.
IMMIGR.
SCH.
http://www.law.unc.edu/documents/clinicalprograms/
theintemationallegallandscapeofextraordinaryrendition.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2012) (a careful study in over
eight pages by three law students that delineated the applications of the ICCPR and CAT as a clinical program
exercise).
89.
Diane Shelly, Why Torture Is Naturally Wrong, INST. FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT (Apr. 19, 2006),
http://www.globalengage.org/issues/articles/security/536-why-torture-is-naturally-wrong.html.
90.
President Bush Admits to CIA's Secret Prisons, BBC NEWS (Sept. 7, 2006),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5321606.stm. The President stated "the CIA had used an alternate set of procedures
agreed with the justice department, once the suspects had stopped talking." Id
See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, ICRC Report On The Treatment Of Fourteen "High Value
91.
Detainees" in CIA Custody 8-20 (2007) [hereinafter ICRC Report of 2007], available at
http://www.nybooks.com/
media/doc/2010/04/22/icrc-report.pdf.
Bush Defends Detention Policy, Says U.S. 'Does Not Torture', PBS NEWS HOUR (Oct. 7, 2007),
92.
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/north america/july-decG7/bush_10-05.html.
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interrogations and rendition of detainees amounted to impunity towards multiple
treaty obligations of the United States, because they were in conflict with his
constitutional obligations under Article II, section 3's Take Care Clause to uphold
these binding international obligations.9 3
B. The Secretary of State - Colin Powell
After the President and the Vice President, the United States Secretary of State
is next in line for succession to the presidency.9 4 Secretary of State Colin Powell
should have been the key advisor to the Executive Officer during the post 9/11 era,
particularly on matters relating to international law, foreign relations and the
undertaking of a multinational war on terrorism. 9s The Department of State's Legal
Staff is primarily responsible for furnishing advice on all legal issues, domestic and
international, arising in the course of the State Department's efforts. 96 These legal
duties include "assisting department principles and policy officers in formulating
and implementing the foreign policies of the United States, and promoting the
development of international law and its institutions as a fundamental element of
these policies." 9 7 Referred to as the "L," the department was headed by William
Howard Taft, IV, who was also an Assistant Secretary of State.98 Taft held the
primary responsibility for advising anyone from the President through the Cabinet
on matters of international law and foreign affairs-and his interpretation and
advice on the applicability of international law obligations were at considerable
odds with the position adopted by the President, Department of Defense,
Department of Justice and the CIA.99
Taft quickly recognized that suspension of the Geneva Conventions of 1949
and related international obligations of the United State could not be justified by
any categorization of the detainees as "unlawful combatants."' 0 0 The confrontation
between the State Department and the White House on the subject of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 occurred after Powell had read Alberto Gonzales's proposed
memorandum addressed to President Bush of January 25, 2002.101 Powell initially
responded with his own five-page memorandum addressed to both the White
House counsel and the Assistant to the President for National Security, Dr.
93.
94.

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
See THE WHITE HOUSE AND CABINET, http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/cabinet (last visited

Sept. 24, 2012).
95.
See Biographies of The SecretariesofState: Colin L. Powell, Office of the Historian, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, http://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/powell-colin-luther (last visited Nov. 11, 2012).
96.
See Office of the Legal Advisor, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/l (last visited Nov. I1,
2012).
97.
Id.
98.
Memorandum from William H. Taft, IV, Dep't of State Office of The Legal Advisor, Regarding
Comments on Your Paper on the Geneva Convention to the Counsel of the President (Feb. 2, 2002) [hereinafter
Taft Memo], availableat http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html/politics/20040608_DOC.pdf.
99.
Id.
100.
Id. at 4-5.
101.
See Memorandum from Colin. L Powell, Sec'y of State, on Draft Decision Memorandum for the
President on the Applicability of the Geneva Convention to the Conflict in Afghanistan to the Counsel to the
President (Jan. 26, 2002), availableat http://www.gwu.edul-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBBl27/02.01.26.pdf.
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Condoleezza Rice, cogently delineating the reasons for upholding the Geneva
Conventions and the Laws of War.102 Taft addressed a more comprehensive
opinion that strongly affirmed the application of the Geneva Conventions of 1949
to treatment of captives and detainees to prevent the desire of White House
counsel, Alberto Gonzales, to advise President Bush of Geneva's non-application
to detainees in the war on terrorism.' 0 3 Taft's memorandum was rejected by the
President and the growing cabal-Gonzales, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Rumsfeld's laterdescribed "Working Group" and a so-called "War Council"-all who advocated
for harsh treatment of captured detainees.'" The inputs from the War Council and
Rumsfeld's Working Group provided President Bush with all of the justifications
that enabled him to present his February 7, 2002, memorandum to senior officials,
confirming that the Geneva Conventions would not be applicable to Taliban
105
captives.
This would be followed by a number of unprecedented steps by President Bush
to continue to circumvent the United States obligations that were of binding
character. These decisions were advised by the War Council, a small group of
lawyers in the government, less qualified to advise the Executive to take these steps
involving international law that conflicted with Taft's advice.'0 6 Powell and Taft
would not be the onl' major figures intentionally bypassed by this growing cabal in
their anti-international law sentiment and their development of policies and
practices for the war on terrorism; this pattern of impunity was embedded in a
matter of weeks and coalesced with the successful rejection of the Powell-Taft
opinions on the laws of war.107

102.
Id. Powell criticized the White House counsel's memorandum because it did not provide the President
with options. Id. When faced with the "cons" of not applying the Geneva conventions to the conflict in
Afghanistan, Powell noted that it could:
[R]everse a century of U.S. policy and practice in supporting the Geneva conventions[;] ...
[have a] high cost in terms of negative international reaction[;] . . . undermine public
support among critical allies[;] . .. .[In addition,] Europeans and others will likely have
legal problems with extradition" which could cause "individual foreign prosecutors to
investigate and prosecute our officials and troops. . . . [Further, this could cause]
challenge[s] in international fora (U.N. Commission on Human Rights; World Court; etc.).
Id at 2-3. Powell also provided his comments in a bulleted list addressing certain deficiencies of the Gonzales
memorandum. Id at 2-4.
103.
Taft Memo, supra note 98, at 1, 4-5. Taft enumerated the reasons for fully applying the Geneva
Conventions to Al Qaeda and the Taliban, including "the unvaried practice of the United States in introducing its
forces into conflict over 50 years." id. at 1. He also exhorted the necessity of taking that as a preference in a policy
position for the United States international obligations. Id.
104.
Scharf, supra note 80, at 389-91, 402-03.
105.

JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE 121-22 (First Anchor Books 2008).

106.
Scharf, supranote 80, at 389, 397. Neither Taft nor his staff had an opportunity to review that effort; in
fact they were "unaware that it was being done." Id. This attitude of contempt for the Department of State was
coupled with the desire to treat its legal advice with impunity. Id.
107.
MAYER, supra note 105, at 68-69 (recounting the establishment of the illegal monitoring of the
communications network, a.k.a. "domestic spying," a program desired by the President).
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C. The Office of the Vice President-Dick Cheney
The second major figure in the pattern of impunity was the Vice President,
Dick Cheney, who assumed quasi-executive authority not seen in prior
administrations, by asserting major influences on the decisions to capture and
aggressively interrogate captives during the war on terrorism.'s Cheney's powers
under the Constitution were limited to: (1) presiding over the Senate and, (2)
casting the tie-breaking vote when necessary in the Senate.109 As to other
constitutional powers, there are none." 0 These.limitations did not prevent Cheney's
aggressive and persistent efforts to push for harsh interrogations of detainees, albeit
unlawful under international law, for which he, Donald Rumsfeld, the War Council
and others overrode concerns expressed by other branches of government regarding
the Geneva Conventions or the CAT."' Cheney stood side-by-side with President
Bush on daily briefings on intelligence and other matters.1 2 He was instrumental in
blocking the Taft opinions from influencing President Bush that the proposed
actions against detainees would constitute "grave breaches" of the- Geneva
Conventions." 3 Cheney's view of the "new paradigm" following the 9/11 attack
was expressed in public comments to the press providing the audience with hints
about the type of dark practices that would have to be undertaken."14 Once the
unlawful practices were ongoing, Cheney expanded his influence over the Justice
Department and others in the administration, some of whom admitted being
"intimidated" by him and his Chief of Staff, David Addington, member of the War
Council.1 15 Cheney and Addington established a web of restrictive secrecy over the
practices that were ongoing, thereby undermining even a glimmer of
"transparency" in governance or allowances of public access to the "inside"
information about the ongoing treatment of detainees." 6
Cheney never retreated from his position on the rendition or torture of the
detainees; nor has he expressed any concerns regarding the negative implications
of such practices for the United States' status in the global community.' '7 His
contemporary remarks confirm that he holds no regrets, whatsoever, for the
infliction of torture-including waterboarding-on detainees." 8 The measure of
108.
Id. at 308-09.
109.
U.S. CONST. art 1,§ 3. Under the article II of the Constitution, the Vice President has certain powers in
the case of the death or disability of a sitting president. Id. at art 11.However, none of those are applicable to the
subject of this paper.
110.
U. S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
Ill.
Scharf supranote 80, at 389-90.
112.
MAYER, supra note 105, at 296.
113.
Id. at 121-23 (describing the intense "out of public" fight over the Taft versus Yoo opinions in
determining the course of action to take regarding the detainees, with Yoo's position prevailing).
114.
Duncan, supra note 67, at 81. Cheney's comment was that the "government needed to work through,
sort of, the dark side . .. using sources and methods that are available to our intelligence agencies." Id.
115.
MAYER, supra note 105, at 308-09.
116.
Id. at 268-70.
117.
Chris McGreal, Dick Cheney Defends Use of Torture on al-QaidaLeaders, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 9,
2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011 /sep/09/dick-cheney-defends-torture-al-qaida.
118.
Former US VP Cheney Defends Iraq War, Waterboarding, VOICE OF AMERICA,
http://www.voanews.com/content/former-us-vp-cheney-defends-iraq-war-waterboarding--
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impunity exhibited by him on the subject of United States international obligations
relating to captives during his two terms in office would be difficult to compare
with that of any other Vice-President and his persistence in defending his stance is
now legendary.' 19 Cheney expressed it best saying, "the interrogations were used
on hard terrorist[s] after other efforts had failed. They were legal, essential, and the

right thing to do."

20

D. The Secretary Of Defense-Donald Rumsfeld
The Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, worked closely with Cheney and
assumed a commanding role over the military during the war on terrorism, while
executing his own prerogatives through the formation of his "Working Group" to
block and impede Powell and Taft's positions and advice relating to the decisions
to apply harsh treatment to the detainees.121 The "Working Group" took their
advice from the "War Council," headed nominally by Yoo, and consisted of
Addington, Cheney's Chief of Staff, Jim Haynes, General Counsel to the
Department of Defense Council, and Timothy Flannigan, a former head of the DOJ
OLC and the "Working Group" that was formed by the Secretary of Defense.1 22
The positions of Powell and Taft on the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the CAT
concerns were argued out of consideration in behind the scenes processes by the
War Council. 23 Yoo confirmed that the decision was made to leave the
Department of State out of the deliberations on the treatment of detainees as
follows: "The State Department and OLC often disagree about international law";
the State Department's position that international law is binding on the President
and the United States was contrary to the views held by Yoo and his "War
Council." 24 Based on an extensive review of the legal memorandums from the
128686908/174827.html (last updated Aug. 29, 2011). Cheney added that "the U.S. would object to another
country subjecting an American to the technique [of waterboarding]," but without any rationale for the
differentiation if it involved American or foreign citizens. Id.
119.
MAYER, supra note 105, at 304-05. The secrecy and prevention of any CIA detainees being released or
having access to lawyers was a significant consideration, due to the concern of allegations that CIA agents were
committing prosecutable war crimes. Id. at 305.
120.
PBS Frontline interview by Martin Smith with FBI agent Ali Soufan, PBS FRONTLINE (Sept. 13, 2011)
[hereinafter FRONTLINE INTERVIEW], available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/iraq-war-on-terror/theinterrogator/transcript-7/ (including comment by former Vice-President Dick Cheney).
121.
MAYER, supra note 105, at 228-29.
122.
Scharf, supra note 80, at 389-90; MAYER, supra note 105, at 66-68. The DOJ OLC would become the
fountainhead for dozens of legal opinions authored by Yoo, Bybee, Bradbury and others counseling on the
methods used during harsh interrogations to circumvent the United States' legal obligations under international
law and the previously identified conventions to which the United States is a party. Scharf supra note 80, at 38991.
123.
Gonzales Memo to President of Jan. 25, 2002, supra note 37. Scharf confirms the high status of the
Legal Advisor: someone who is "appointed by the president of the United States and subject to the advice and
consent of the Senate." Scharf, supra note 80, at 392. Scharf a former "L" counsel, reveals that the troubling
international implications of the decision to ignore the authenticity and credibility of memos on international law
from the highest source expose the impunity with which government officials collectively regarded the
international conventions to which the United States was a party. Id.
124.
Scharf, supra note 80, at 392. Yoo confirmed this position in his 2006 book, in public presentations and
debates, one of which was moderated by this author at the Chapman University College of Law in 2007. See JOHN
Yoo, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCoUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR (2006).
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OLC beginning in 2002 through 2009, the authors of those legal opinions were
unequivocally opposed to the application of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the
CAT and the Laws Of War in any context that conflicted with the determinations
by the President, Cheney, Rumsfeld, and other senior officials to use the harshest
possible methods to extract information from detainees.125 In essence, this created a
Defense Department hierarchy at virtual odds with its own governing doctrines
expressed in FM 27-10 and FM 34-52 as well as the body of international
humanitarian law by which it should have been bound.
As an example, Rumsfeld's purpose in acquiring legal memorandums from the
DOJ OLC through his General Counsel, Haynes, was to fully justify harsh
interrogation techniques that would be administered to detainees.12 6 These thirtyfour techniques were later reduced to twenty-four that were documented in various
memoranda and directives by Rumsfeld and his Working Group, and which were
eventually approved on April 16, 2003, for Guantinamo.127 The techniques
included the practices of dietary manipulation, environmental manipulation (cold,
heat, and other factors), sleep adjustment, isolation, and others, along with
Rumsfeld's admonition that "the United States Armed Forces shall continue to
treat detainees humanely, and to the extent appropriate and consistent with military
necessity in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions." 28
Rumsfeld was actually far behind the loop in his memo because an earlier draft of
it in received full authorization from a senior Army JAG Lieutenant Colonel, Diane
Beaver in 2002, who admonished senior Army officials at Guantinamo to fully
apply the practices, including waterboarding, which may have even been beyond
Rumsfeld's intent.129 According to Jameel Jaffer and Amrit Singh, Rumsfeld
already "verbally" authorized so-called special interrogation methods for detainees
at Guantinamo in November 2002, and by December of that year issued a written
directive allowing the prisoners at that location to be subjected to a variety of
techniques that were contained in a specific memorandum by him. 3 0
Before the explosive disclosures about Abu Ghraib, there had been numerous
reports regarding detainee abuse by 2005.131 Once his interrogation practices were
implemented at Guantinamo, they were exported to detention facilities in Iraq and
Afghanistan, resulting in the later exposure of the outrageous practices performed
by military personnel at Abu Ghraib.132 Those practices resulted in Senate hearings

125.

Scharf, supra note 80, at 391-402.

126.
127.

Id.; see JAMEEL JAFFER & AMRIT SINGH, ADMINISTRATION OF TORTURE 46-47 (2007).
JAFFER & SINGH, supra note 126, at 47-49.

128.
Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, Sec'y of Def., Regarding Counter-Resistance Techniques in the
War on Terrorism, to Commander, U.S. Southern Command (April 16, 2003) [hereinafter Rumsfeld Memo of Apr.
16, 2003], available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/041603rumsfeld.pdf.
129.
Lt. Col. Beaver Memo of Oct. 11, 2002, supra note 14, at 6-7.
110.
JAFFER & SINGH, supra note 126, at 47.
131.
Church Report, supranote 56, at 49-76 (identifying various levels of mistreatment of detainees and the
application of techniques substantially outside of Rumsfeld's "approved" interrogation techniques).
132.
Id.
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that would eventually end Rumsfeld's career as Defense Secretary in 2006.133
Rumsfeld echoed Cheney in the same PBS interview by stating: "[A]nyone who
suggests that the enhanced techniques-let's be blunt, waterboarding-did not
produce certain amounts of valuable intelligence just isn't facing the truth."1 34
E. The Central Intelligence Agency--George Tenet
The Central Intelligence Agency was created during World War II by the
establishment of the Office of Secret Services (OSS).135 The CIA is not part of the
United States military forces, and therefore not subject to military command
structures or the FM 27-10.136 The CIA's mission is forming part of the nation's
"first line of defense" under the core value of integrity.137 The CIA's mission
statement declares: "Integrity: we uphold the highest standards of conduct. We
seek and speak the truth-to our colleagues and to our customers."' 38 The agency's
task is "collecting information that reveals the plans, intentions and capabilities of
our adversaries and provides the basis for decision and action."1 3 9 George Tenet, a
Clinton presidency holdover, was the United States CIA director on September 11,
2001, though he was not necessarily considered to have been an effective leader of
the CIA in their efforts to uncover information or analysis of available intelligence
that might have prevented the 9/11 attack.140 This caused Tenet considerable
insecurity for his continued position as CIA director and spurred his efforts to
prove the CIA's capacity to President Bush and other senior officials to effectively
gather intelligence that would prevent further attacks.141
However ineffective the agency may have been in preventing the calamitous
9/11 attack, Tenet was almost too eager to undertake any assignments in the post
Rumsfeld Leaves Office in Finest Military Fashion, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2006), available at
133.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/dec/15/20061215-103351-4011r/; CARL LEVIN, COMM. CHAIR, S.
ARMED SERV. COMM. REP. OF ITS INQUIRY INTO THE TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY

(Dec. 11, 2008), available at http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/speeches/speech/statement-of-senator-carllevin-on-senate-armned-services-committee-report-of-its-inquiry-into-the-treatment-of-detainees-in-us-

custody/?section=speeches.
134.

FRONTLINE INTERVIEW, supra note 120.

135.
History of the CIA, CIA.Gov, https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/history-of-the-cia/index.html (last updated
Dec. 30, 2011, 12:48 PM).
Id
136.
137.
CIA Vision, Mission, and Values, CIA.GOv (Dec. 30, 2011, 12:45 PM) [hereinafter CIA Vision],
available at https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/cia-vision-mission-values/index.html.
Id.
138.
139.
History of the CIA, supra note 135. It also includes the mission of "conducting covert action at the
direction of the President to preempt threats are achieved US policy objectives." CIA Vision, supra note 138.
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 266-71, 274-77. The Report cast considerable doubt
140.
on the effectiveness of the CIA. Id. This would appear to be at odds with the CIA's published mission statement
noted above. Compare id., with CIA Vision, supra note 138. Tenet is reported to have been so concerned about the
failures of the CIA and his operatives that he secured President Bush's promise to prevent any investigation into
the CIA's record on Al Qaeda and the 9/11 attack. THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5; MAYER, supra
note 105, at 24-25.
141.
MAYER, supranote 105, at 23-25. Mayer catalogued the "missed opportunities" to have intercepted the
Al Qaeda operatives responsible for 9/11; however, President Bush rebuffed congressional criticism of Tenet's
performance, perhaps as a result of Tenet transferring his noted propensity for "pleasing bosses" to his new boss,
President Bush. Id. A former CIA officer described Tenet as a "puppy dog wagging his tail and tagging along"
which was consistent with his desire to keep his job in the Bush administration. Id.
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9/11 era, including the administration of harsh interrogations authorized by the Yoo
and other OLC memorandums.14 2 The use of secret or "black sites" for the
interrogation of high-value detainees resulted in the recovery of some valuable
intelligence and the ability to boast the capture of Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, alias
"KSM," the chief planner of the 9/11 attack.14 3 KSM would be subjected to the
most extreme interrogation methods by the CIA interrogators, including frequent
waterboarding and much worse practices than any of his companion detainees
experienced.'"
The legal authority for the CIA to engage in such practices was provided in
legal opinions generated by the DOJ OLC attorneys' Yoo and Bybee addressed to
John Rizzo, a CIA counsel and provided the legal "cover" for the CIA to engage in
a variety of harsh interrogation practices that included: administration of
waterboarding, shackling in contorted positions for extended periods, extremes of
heat, cold, loud noise, light and darkness, forced nakedness, water dousing, sleep
and food deprivation and other extreme measures.14 5 A number of these techniques
were found in the Rumsfeld memorandum on techniques for interrogating
detainees, but they were significantly enhanced once in the hands of the CIA and
without any effective constraints from the FM 27-10, FM 34-52, or international
humanitarian law to curb the grossly unlawful practices on detainees.14 6
The OLC's memorandums to the CIA's General Counsel that supported the
increased level of torture that could be applied to detainees without running afoul
of any provisions of domestic or international law are enlightening because they
also demonstrate a palpable level of impunity to the Geneva Conventions of 1949,
the CAT and ICCPR. 14 Steven G. Bradbury's May 10, 2005 memorandum
deliberately sidestepped the United States Torture Statute on grounds that the
practices would be observed by CIA's Office of Medical Services (OMS),148
adding that the observations from representatives of OMS to the OLC are "that the
waterboard technique is not physically painful."l 49 Bradbury neglected to advise
142.
MAYER, supra note 105, at 145-48. Drumheller questioned Tenet's role in the CIA undertaking the
interrogations saying, "This is really the legacy of a director who never said no to anybody." Id.
143.
Id.
144.
Id. at 270-72. KSM was deemed a "high-value" detainee who would be subjected to the worst methods
of interrogation on a prolonged basis to a point where even CIA officials were compelled to pull back on the
applications of torture to KSM at the risk of causing his demise and/or perhaps acquiring incorrect intelligence
information. Id. at 273-75. Mayer notes that even CIA officials agreed that KSM and others were being tortured.
Id. One same official responded to issues of the application of laws to the interrogation and treatment of detainees
with the following: "Who the F . .. Cares?" Id.
145.
Bybee Memo to Rizzo of Aug. 1, 2002, supra note 79; Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury,
Principal Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., DOJ OLC, Regarding Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to the
Combined Use of Certain Techniques in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees to John A. Rizzo,
Acting Gen. Counsel, CIA (May 10, 2005) [hereinafter Bradbury Memo to Rizzo of May 10, 2005], available at
http://media.luxmedia.com/aclulolc 05102005 bradbury 20pg.pdf.
146.
Id; see Rumsfeld Memo of Apr. 16, 2003, supra note 128.
147.
Yoo Letter of Aug. 1, 2002, supra note 86; Bybee Memo to Rizzo of Aug. 1, 2002, supra note 79;
Bybee Memo to Gonzales of Feb. 7, 2002, supra note 86; Bradbury Memo Rizzo of May 10, 2005, supra note
145.
148.
Bradbury Memo to Rizzo of May 10, 2005, supra note 145, at 29-30.
149.
Id. at 42. Bradbury assured the CIA's General Counsel that CIA's Office of Medical Services [OMS]
had informed the OLC of that opinion regarding the non-pain associated with waterboarding. Id. at 44.
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the CIA's General Counsel Rizzo of the trial of twenty-three Nazi-era physicians at
Nuremberg, who had engaged in practices of human experimentation that
amounted to torture and abuse of detainees, despite their defense claim that it was
done in the interest of saving the lives of German soldiers.so Many of the
physicians were convicted and some sentenced to life terms, confirming the
rejection of that kind of defense by state officials or other actors of "national
interest or security" to justify torture or inhuman treatment of any captives.'
Independent of the Nuremberg Principles that were used to determine the
responsibility of physicians in 1946, the Geneva Conventions, CAT, and ICCPR
presented even greater legal obstacles to claims that the practice of torture used for
"intelligence gathering purposes," somehow provided immunity for those who
planned, designed or implemented it.15 2 But the CIA advocates for waterboarding
or other techniques remain unrepentant as evidenced by comments from Jos6
Rodriguez, head of the CIA's Counterterrorist Center, whose idea ten years ago
was for the use of harsh interrogation techniques. 5 3 Rodriguez continually and
publicly defends his ideas today.154
After the 9/11 attack, the practice of waterboarding was taken from the military
SERE program-an acronym for "Survival, Evade, Resist, and Escape" training
that was used to train thousands of military personnel as part of survival training in
case of capture-1 5 5 and administered to the military trainees just once for
approximately twenty seconds or less in a closely controlled setting.15 6 There is a
significant difference between the "training setting" application and the
applications of it to KSM and other "high level" detainees in excess of 100
times.' 5 7 Senator Carl Levin's Committee Report recognized the incomparable
150.
See generally 2 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuemberg Military Tribunals under Control
1949),
available
at
10,
Nuernberg
(Oct.
1946-Nov.
Council
Law
No.
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLaw/pdfiNTwar-criminals Vol-IL.pdf.
Id.
151.
152.
Geneva Conventions of 1949 Ill, supra note 28, at art. 12; CAT, supra note 29, at art. 1; ICCPR, supra
note 30, at arts. 7, 14.
153.
60 Minutes Overtime: Hard Measures, Part I (CBS News television broadcast Apr. 29, 2012),
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18560_162-57423533/hard-measures-ex-cia-head-defends-post-9-1 1tactics/.
Id. Jose Rodriguez defends CIA actions after 9/11 in his interview with Leslie Stahl, stating "we made
154.
some Al-Qaeda terrorists with American blood on their hands uncomfortable for a few days, but we did the right
thing for the right reason, and the right reason was to protect the homeland and to protect American lives." Id.
Physicians for Human Rights, Experiments in Torture: Evidence of Human Subject Research and
155.
Experimentation in the "Enhanced" Interrogation Program at 5 n.4 (June 2010), available at
http://phrtorturepapers.org.
156.
U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Origins of
Aggressive Interrogation Techniques: Part I of the Committee's Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S.
Custody, June 2008 [hereinafter Senate Hearing Report of 2008], available at http://armedservices.senate.gov/
(noting the
Transcripts/2008/06%2OJun/a%2OfULL%20cOMMITTEE/08-53%20.%-206-17-08%20-%20am.pdf
obvious: the military schools took extreme care to ensure that no student was injured during the short
administration of waterboarding for a period of twenty seconds or less, which was an experience unlikely to be the
experience of detainees who were forcibly waterboarded on multiple occasions for much for longer periods).
Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., DOJ-OLC, Regarding
157.
Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain
Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees to John A. Rizzo, Acting
at
available
30,
2005,
May
Agency,
Intelligence
Central
Gen.
Counsel,
http://s3.amazonaws.com/propublica/assets/missingmemos/28OLCmemofinalredact30May05.pdf.
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nature of administering a single twenty seconds application of waterboarding to a
military trainee in controlled circumstances versus the administration of the
procedures repeatedly and for longer periods to detainees who lack the power or
protection from the effects of those practices." 8 It would appear that the more
obvious impediment for the defense of "intelligence gathering" is the specific
admonition for non-derogation from the three major international instruments'
principles addressed in this paper.15 9
Tenet's continued advocacy and support for the harsh interrogation techniques
was provided after the end of the Bush Administration when he and several former
CIA directors wrote to President Barack Obama in a plea to prevent the Justice
Department from going forward with the inquiry into "past abuses during
interrogation of terrorism suspects" based on the former CIA directors' argument
that the inquiry would "seriously damage the nation's ability to protect itself."160
The Obama Administration's response, described later, blunted the effort to hold
CIA senior officials or individuals accountable for any violations of domestic or

international law.161
VIII. WAS IT TORTURE, CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT?

A. The Senate Report
The 2008 United States Senate Report, authored by Senators Carl Levin and
John McCain, graphically chronicles many of the deliberate steps taken by the
President, Vice President, Rumsfeld, OLC lawyers Yoo and Bybee, and others to
implement harsh interrogation techniques and renditions on detainees with secret
efforts to ignore the obligations of the United States under the Geneva Conventions
of 1949, the CAT, and ICCPR.16 2 The Senate Committee heard from General
David A. Petraeus in a letter addressed to the Senate Committee on June 10, 2007
that stated:
We are engaged in combat. We must pursue the enemy
relentlessly, and we must be violent at times. What sets us apart
from our enemies in this fight, however, is how we behave. In
everything we do, we must observe the standards and values that

158.
Senate Hearing Report of 2008, supra note 156.
159.
CAT, supra note 29, at art. 2(2); Geneva Conventions of 1949 IV, supra note 28, at art. 5; ICCPR,
supra note 30, at art. 4(3).
160.
Peter Baker, CIA Chiefs Ask Obama to Abandon Abuse Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2009, at A6,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/19/world/I9intel.html.
161.
Id. The president left the decision to Attorney General Eric Holder, whose appointment of John
Durham to conduct the limited inquiry resulted in no findings or recommendations for criminal or any other
charges. Id; see A Missed Chancefor Accountability, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2011, at A26, available at
http://travel.nytimes.com/2011/08/12/opinion/hold-the-cia-accountable.html.
John Durham "decided against
prosecuting any CIA officials," with the backdrop of a failed attempt by the American Civil Liberties Union to
obtain a civil contempt remedy against the CIA. Id.
162.
Senate Hearing Report of 2008, supra note 156.
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dictate that we treat noncombatants and detainees with dignity and
respect.'6 3
The Senate Committee's findings included the fact that by December of 2002
Rumsfeld had already approved the recommendations of his General Counsel
Haynes, to "use aggressive techniques," but they were approved without
"providing any written guidance as to how they were to be administered."'
Rumsfeld was already soliciting inputs for methods on exploitation of the detainees
by December 2001, months before the President signed his February 7, 2002
memorandum stating that the Geneva Conventions would not apply to the Taliban
detainees.165 The ultimate finding was that Rumsfeld planned and implemented
through his Working Group the practices of "aggressive interrogation techniques . .
. physical pressures and degradation [as] appropriate treatment for detainees in U.S.
military custody . . . [resulting in] an erosion in standards dictating that detainees

be treated humanely."l 6 6
B. U.S. Military Reports
From the military perspective, the basic question is: Did the practices of
treatment and interrogation of detainees by the military personnel or its civilian
contractor's amount to torture in violation of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and
the CAT? 6 7 Based on the reports that were issued from the United States military
and other government agencies, the answer is a decided "yes."' 68 Major General
Antonio Tagubu produced a report in 2004 that focused entirely on the abuses at
Abu Ghraib, which documented countless incidents of unlawful practices
performed on detainees together with photographs taken of the detainees that
would later rivet the public's attention on that detention facility.169 In March 2005,
Vice Admiral A. T. Church III, United States Navy, presented his Department of
Defense Detention Operations And Detainee Interrogation Techniques (Church
Report) for the office of the Secretary of Defense that contained a summary of the
previous reports relating to interrogation or detainee abuse.' 70 The documentation
of a number of previous reports on the subject of mistreatment of detainees covered
some thirty-three pages of the Church Report that catalogued a repetition of the

163.
Id. at 12.
164.
Senate Armed Services Committee, Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody, Executive
Summary xix (Dec. 11, 2008) [hereinafter Senate Hearing Report of 2008, Executive Summary], available at
http://www.levin.senate.gov/imo/medialdoc/supporting/2008/Detainees.121108.pdf. The interrogation techniques,
including waterboarding of detainees, were also to be applied in Afghanistan and Iraq. Id. at xxii-xxiii.
165.
Id. at xiii.
166.
Id. at xxix.
167.
Geneva Conventions of 1949 Ill, supra note 28, at art. 13; CAT, supra note 29, at art. 1.
168.
See generally Geneva Conventions of 1949 Ill, supra note 28, at art. 13; CAT, supra note 29, at art. 1.
169.
United States Central Command, Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, 2004,
15-20, [hereinafter Tagubu Report], available at http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/prison-abuse report.pdf.
170.
Church Report, supra note 56 at 49-83.

Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2012

23

Barry Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 4

110

Barry Law Review

Vol. 18, No. I

practices along with the need for addressing the conditions of treatment of the
detainees.17 '
At the time of the Church Report a separate United States military independent
panel determined that some 50,000 detainees had been processed through various
detention centers and that some 300 allegations of abuse had been formally made,
of which sixty-six had been substantiated.172 But since all of the investigations
were not completed, a set of statistics could point to a more significant number of
abuses beyond the detainees who risked making a complaint.' 73 Furthermore, the
actions attributed to the principals identified in these reports demonstrated that they
were done intentionally and with impunity by senior officials respecting the United
States' international obligations required by the international instruments, the Laws
of War, and our own domestic law.174
The Church Report also referred to the earlier Tagubu Report, noting that
Major General Tagubu relied on the reports of two other ranking officers to reach
his findings that military police personnel had intentionally abused detainees in
multiple modes including: punching, slapping, kicking, forced nakedness, forcing
groups of detainees to masturbate in groups, placing dog chains or straps around
their necks, using military dogs to intimidate and frighten detainees and other
unacceptable techniques.17 5 The Church Report unmistakably identified specific
acts of torture beyond the Rumsfeld "approved techniques" that had been spawned
by his authorization of extreme practices.176 These were not the only major military
reports; however, those cited provide convincing evidence of the conditions of
detainees that were known in the military establishment as early as 2003 to 2005.
C. The Department of Justice Report of 2009
According to the later Office of Inspector General, Department of Justice
Report of 2009 (DOJ OIG Report of 2009), the 2003 Iraq Interrogation Policy by
Rumsfeld explicitly authorized the use of sleep deprivation or interruption, which
was one of the most frequently reported forms of detainee treatment by military
and CIA personnel as reported by FBI agents who served in Iraq.17 7 The extensive
report graphically identified the following practices that were observed by FBI
agents at different locations: beating, choking, strangling, burning, use of electric
shock, harsh and prolonged shackling, sexual abuse or contact, waterboarding,

Id
171.
172.
Id. at 78.
Id.
173.
174.
Id.at 78-79.
Id. at 61-65. Major General Tagubu made numerous recommendations to be implemented to eliminate
175.
the practices that were described above. Id.; Tagubu Report, supranote 169, at 17.
176.
See generally Church Report, supra note 56.
Office of the Inspector General-Department of Justice Report, A Review of the FBI's Involvement and
177.
Observation of Detainee Interrogations in Guantinamo Bay, Afghanistan, and Iraq, Oct. 2009, 255-56, available
at http://www.thetorturedatabase.org/files/foiasubsite/doj oig report as reprocessed for_20091030.pdf.
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deprivation of food and water, forced nakedness, and actual or threatened transfer

to a third country.178
The DOJ OIG Report of 2009 confirmed that FBI agents also observed
detainees who were subjected to other forms of mistreatment, which included:
extreme temperatures, use of working dogs, isolation, mistreatment of the Koran,
use of bright lights and loud music, use of duct tape, withholding medical care, and
transfer to another country, which demonstrated that the Rumsfeld authorization
for "some" harsh interrogation practices spawned many methods of more extreme
torture and inhumane treatment that also violated the CAT, the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and FM 27-10.179
An unusual aspect of the treatment of detainees during interrogations were
methods that would clearly violate international humanitarian law and may have
included the administration of psychoactive drugs for treatment purposes while
interrogations were ongoing, but the government has steadfastly denied suggestions
in an official report recently released under a Freedom of Information Request that
any of the drugs that were administered were for the express purpose of facilitating
interrogations.' 8 0
D. International Committee of the Red Cross Reports
The ICRC is charged under various international conventions with overseeing
the condition of detainees (wounded, civilians, prisoners of war, others) during
times of war or conflict."' The ICRC's mission is to "respond rapidly and
efficiently to the humanitarian needs of people affected by armed conflict or by a
natural disaster occurring in a conflict area."'18 2 The ICRC activities are embodied
in the principles of humanitarian law under both the Hague 1907 and the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 among other instruments, to authorize its activities intended
to "limit the effect of armed conflict" by protecting "persons who are not or are no
longer taking part in hostilities" and restricting the "methods and means of
warfare." 8 3 This includes ICRC representatives' visits to locations where civilians,
178.
Id. at 238-50, 258.
179.
Id. at 182-87, 190-94, 196.
180.
World
Medical
Association,
Declaration
of
Tokyo
(1975),
available
at
http://www.cirp.org/library/ethics/tokyo/ (in its Declaration stating "the doctor shall not provide any premises,
instruments, substances or knowledge to facilitate the practice of torture or other forms of cruel, inhumane or
degrading treatment or to diminish the ability of the victim to resist such treatment"). United States Department of
Defense Deputy Inspector General For Intelligence, Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Mind-Altering
Drugs
to
Facilitate
Interrogations
of Detainees,
Sept.
23,
2009,
2-5,
available at
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/395950/pentagon-inspector-generals-report-investigation.pdf. That OIG
report concludes that none of the drugs were administered for the direct purpose of the interrogation. Id. However,
they were provided during the course of interrogations, including for interrogated persons with "serious mental
health conditions and were being treated with psychoactive medications on a continuing basis." Id at i.
Geneva Conventions 1949 III & IV, Commentary, supra note 28, at arts. 9, 10 (documenting the
181.
increasing role of the Red Cross in matters relating to civilians, wounded, and prisoners of war); Geneva
Convention 1929, supranote 26, at arts. 79, 88.
182.
ICRC, What We Do, ICRC.ORG, http://www.icrc.org/eng/what-we-do/index.jsp (last updated Mar. 25,
2013).
183.
ICRC, War and InternationalHumanitarianLaw, ICRC.ORG, available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/warand-law/overview-war-and-law.htm (last updated May 11, 2012) (providing an overview of international
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prisoners of war, or other captives are being detained for the specific purposes of
examining the conditions of their detention, health, sanitation, food, water and
conditions of their confinement under humanitarian law principles.'
As a high contracting party to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and the
applicable laws of armed conflict, the United States was obligated to fully
cooperate with the ICRC to allow them to freely conduct visits and inspections at
all detention facilities or camps during the post 9/11 conflict, including access to all
detainees.' 85 The conditions under which the detainees were held at Guantdinamo
and facilities in Iraq, Afghanistan and other locations often dissuaded United States
officials from identifying all detainees or allowing ICRC access to the "high value
detainees."' 86 The ICRC's practice is to provide their reports of an inspection of
any contracting parties' detention facilities that document any deficiencies or
recommendations for modifications of the conditions of the detainees or any of the
humanitarian aspects of it.18 7 The reports rarely made public because the ICRC's
primary interest is to improve the conditions of detention under humanitarian law,
so its intent is to avoid publicly embarrassing government officials to accomplish
its primary goals.188
In the cases of detainees, including those subject to rendition, the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 affirmed the long-standing humanitarian role of the ICRC in
the protection of prisoners of war-an obligation the ICRC was specifically
prevented from carrying out in cases of so-called "high level" detainees taken to
secret locations by the Bush Administration's CIA operatives.189 The blocking of
access to the high-level detainees resulted in the intentional leak to the public of the
ICRC's report of February 14, 2007, done out of exasperation following multiple
failed attempts to identify the location and gain access to the fourteen "high-level
detainees" held in detention at a secret foreign location where they were subjected
to outrageous levels of interrogation techniques, including waterboarding, which
resulted in both physical and mental injuries to the detainees.' 90 One of the
humanitarian law and stating that "the International Committee of the Red Cross is regarded as the 'guardian' of
the Geneva Conventions and various other treaties that constitute international humanitarian law").
184.
ICRC, Respect for the Life and Dignity of the Detainees, ICRC.ORG, available at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/what-we-do/visiting-detainees/overview-visiting-detainees.htm (last updated Mar. 31,
2011) (stating that "through regular visits, the ICRC strives to prevent torture, other forms of ill-treatment, forced
disappearance and extrajudicial executions, and to ensure that detainees enjoy fundamental judicial guarantees").
185.
Geneva Conventions of 1949 IV, supra note 28, at art. 30, 143.
186.
David P. Forsyth, The ICRC: A Unique Humanitarian Protagonist,89 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 865
(2007) at 63, 82-83, available at http://www.icrc.org/englassets/files/other/irrc-865-forsythe.pdf.
187.
ICRC, War andInternationalHumanitarianLaw, supra note 183.
Id.
188.
189.
Geneva Conventions of 1949 Ill, supranote 28, at art. 9 (affirming the role of the ICRC with regards to
the protection of prisoners of war). "The provisions of the present Convention constitute no obstacle to the
humanitarian activities which the International Committee of the Red Cross . . . may . . . undertake for the

protection of prisoners of war and for their relief." Id. ICRC Report of 2007, supra note 91, at 3.
190.
ICRC Report of 2007, supra note 91, at 3-4, 7-8, 10-16. The shocking revelations of the treatment of
the 14 detainees detailed in the report were facilitated after President Bush summarily transferred the detainees to
Guantinamo in response to growing international concern regarding the rendition of detainees to foreign locations
for harsh interrogation and treatment. Id. at 3. See Shirley Gay Stolberg, PresidentBush Moves 14 Held in Secret
to Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/07/us/07detain.html?
pagewanted=all.
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detainees subjected to severe mistreatment, KSM, considered the "mastermind"
behind the 9/11 attack, is years later undergoing a trial before a military tribunal in
Guantanamo for capital crimes related to the 9/11 attack.19' The trial process at
Guantanamo will be complicated by the fact that the defendant has been held in
custody for more than five years at Guantinamo, and the government would like to
use certain evidence obtained in secret through torture but simultaneously protect
the CIA personnel who obtained it from him, thus presenting issues which his
military counsel intends to vigorously contest.192 The loss of transparency or a fair
trial in such a process is obvious.
In a 2012 document regarding the United States detainees from the war on
terrorism, the ICRC defined its role in the protection of all detainees captured to
include visits to various countries where detainees are held, including
Afghanistan.193 These ICRC visits are carried out under a strict set of rules
requiring the detaining authorities to provide its delegates (1) access to all
detainees, (2) ability to speak to detainees privately, (3) a right to repeated and
frequent visits as required, (4) ability to register detainees falling within its
authority, and (5) confidential discussions with the authorities before and after each
visit.' 9 4 Since the 2009 issuance of three Executive Orders regarding detainees by
President Obama, the ICRC has experienced greater cooperation by the United
States in allowing visitation of detainees.' 95
E. The Center for Constitutional Rights
The Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) is a nonprofit organization
"dedicated to advancing and protecting the rights guaranteed by the United States
Constitution and International Law." 96 CCR filed the first major case in the United
States courts, Rasul v. Bush, on behalf of Guantanamo detainees in 2002.'17 The
CCR's July 2006 Report chronicles the steps taken by the United States
government officials for the applications of torture of detainees at Guantinamo and
other foreign locations and includes a summary of the legal consequences of those
actions based on violations of international law.198 The CCR authors noted, "[tlhe
191.
ICRC Report of 2007, supra note 91, at 8-20; see Stolberg, supranote 190; Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
Hearing Gets Chaotic Start, BBC NEWS U.S. & CANADA (May 6, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-uscanada- 17966362. The government is seeking the death penalty against KSM based on his role as a senior planner
of the 9/11 attack. Id.
192.
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (Guantanamo 9/11 Attacks Trial), N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2012),
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/m/khalid-shaikh-mohammed/index.html.
193.
ICRC, Persons detained by the US in Relation to Armed Conflict and the Fight Against TerrorismThe
Role
of
the
ICRC,
ICRC.ORG
(Sept.
1,
2012),
available
at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/united-states-detention.htm.
194.
Id.
Id.
195.
196.
Center for Constitutional Rights-Mission and History, CCRJlUSTICE.ORG, (July 2006),
http://ccrustice.org/files/Report-ReportOnTorture.pdf; see also Report on Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, and
Degrading Treatment of Prisoners at Guantinamo Bay, Cuba, July 2006, 1 [hereinafter CCR Report of July 2006],
available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/Report ReportOnTorture.pdf.
197.
Id.; see also Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
198.
See generally CCR Report of July 2006, supra note 196.
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Third [Geneva] Convention, addressing prisoner of war rights, and the Fourth
[Geneva] Convention addressing civilian rights, contain numerous protections for
persons captured during the military hostilities."' 99 The CCR documented the fact
that many detainees were subjected to even greater forms of cruel, inhumane or
degrading treatment following their capture even before they arrived at
Guantinamo, Bagram, Abu Ghraib or other detention centers under United States
control. 20 0 The CCR recommended "an independent commission [to] fully address
the nature and extent of the use of torture against Guantanamo prisoners." 20 ' The
creation of such a commission is unlikely this many years after the CCR's Report
and it would appear that the work of other governmental and non-governmental
agencies noted in this paper that attempted to address some of the issues will not be
fruitful; however, the CCR's Report and positions do complement others provided
in this paper.
F. The Office of the United Nations Human Rights Commissioner
The United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) investigated
cases of detainee treatment and documented their determinations in a 2006 report
based on the independent findings of five experts, who focused in part on the
Guantinamo detainees and assessments of the conditions and treatment to
determine the implications under international humanitarian and human rights
laws.202 Section III of the UNCHR Report is devoted specifically to the issue of
torture under Article 7 of the ICCPR.20 3 UNCHR identified the application of the
ICCPR's Article 2 (2) under "limits and derogations" to unauthorized interrogation
practices based on the Article's admonition that "[n]o exceptional circumstances
whatsoever" are permitted to State parties for deviation from this obligation. 204
This included the prohibitions against using any form of torture in recognition of
the fact that the prohibition is in the nature of ajus cogens norm, meaning one from
which no member State may derogate. 205 Antonio Cassese identifies the more
recent reasoning of the International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia (ICTY)
"emphasized in Furundzia (with specific reference to the norm prohibiting torture),
[that] peremptory norms produce a 'deterrent effect' in that they signal to all States

199.
Id. at 10. The report also confirms the inability of a state to utilize forms of "exceptionalism" to
rationalize avoiding the obligations of the CAT, a convention equally applicable to the detainees. Id. at 32.
200.
Id. at 28. A prisoner detained in Kandahar before coming to Guantinamo Bay "allege[d] that U.S.
soldiers urinated on prisoners and burned them with cigarettes and that he was made to walk barefoot over broken
glass and his head was pushed into the ground into the glass." Id.
201.
Id.at31.
202.
See U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Civil and Political
Rights-Situation of Detainees at Guantinamo Bay: Rep. of the Chairperson of the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention, Future E/CN.4/2006/120 (Feb. 15, 2006) [hereinafter UNCHR Report of 2006], available at
http://www.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/international/20060216gitmo report.pdf.
203.
Id. at 21-22.
204.
Id. at 21 (discussing the perspectives of the UN Committee Against Torture and the applications of
"Common Article 3" of the Geneva Conventions 1949 to the application of torture to detainees).
205.
Id.; CASSESE, supra note 38, 4t 205-07.
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prohibition enshrines absolute values 'from which
and individuals that 2their
06
nobody may deviate."'
The UNCHR Report of 2006 identified United States law that supported the
international law prohibitions on torture based on the fact that it constitutes "cruel,
unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth
and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States." 207 Under
the category "Use of excessive violence," the Report documents treatment of
detainees, that in the authors' collective opinion, "amount[ed] to torture, [because]
it inflict[ed] severe pain or suffering on the victims for the purposes of intimidation
and/or punishment." 2 0 8 Other categories of mistreatment to detainees at
Guantanamo and other locations, including forced transfer to countries where
detainees would be at serious risk of torture and a lack of impartial investigations,
were also given consideration by the experts.209
The findings of the UNCHR in 2006 were based on reviews of official
documents and interviews of victims and others to substantiate the conclusion that
United States authorities authorized the use of the certain interrogation techniques
addressed in this paper. 210 It was deemed important that:
United States . . . [never contacted] the Secretary-General of the
United Nations or other States parties to the treaties . . . [regarding
its intent to make] . . . official derogation[s] from the International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or any other international
human rights treaty to which it [was] a party.211
The interrogation techniques used by the United States at Guantanamo were
found to have violated Article 7 of the ICCPR and Article 16 of the CAT. 212 The
Report confirmed that "the practice of rendition of persons to countries where there
is a substantial risk of torture .

.

. amounts to a violation of the principle of non-

refoulement and is contrary to Article 3 of the Convention against Torture and
Article 7 of the ICCPR." 2 13
The UNCHR recommended closure of the GuantAnamo facility to enable the
United States to "expeditiously bring[ ] ... detainees to trial, in compliance with . .
. [provisions] of the ICCPR, or release them without further delay." 2 14 Not
surprisingly, the UNCHR's effort was not well received by the Bush
Administration in 2006, nor did it facilitate any substantial compliance with the

206.

CASSESE, supra note 38, at 207.

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

UNCHR Report of 2006, supra note 202, at 22.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 26-27.
Id. at 28-29.
Id. at 36.
UNCHR Report of 2006, supra note 202, at 37.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 38.
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particulars identified in it by the Administration.215 The United States Ambassador
and Permanent Representative to the. United Nations' High Commissioner, Kevin
Edward Moley, issued a draft on January 31, 2006 that objected to various
provisions of the 2006 Report suggesting the reliance on the ICCPR was "flawed"
and "without serious analysis of whether the instruments by their terms apply
extraterritorially." 2 16 A White House spokesperson later responded that the Report
was based on "disinformation deliberately spread by terror groups" and constituted
"a rehash of some of the allegations that have been made by lawyers for some of
the detainees."2 17 These expressions continued the impunity addressed to any
criticism of the practices at Guantinamo or other detention facilities under United
States control.
In 2007, the European Union's Rapporteur for Human Rights, Dick Marty,
reported to the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights on the issue of
detentions and illegal transfers of detainees. 218 His report documented how the
United States selected Poland and Romania "to form special partnerships with
countries that were economically vulnerable, emerging from difficult transitional
periods in their history and dependent upon American support for their strategic
development" for these renditions to secret sites. 2 19 The conditions for renditions to
these locations are reconstructed in Marty's report from information he obtained
from detainees, that are best described in the McCain Amendment to the US
Detainee Treatment Act's language, stating that "if even one single American that
were to be held under these conditions, or treated in this manner, and the American
population would find it abhorrent or unacceptable, then America should not be
practicing the actions in question against detainees whom they hold from other
,,220
countries.
The two European Union States, Poland and Romania, filed "objections" to the
European Union Rapporteur's Report by denying complicity in any rendition or
detention of detainees from the United States, leaving a somewhat perplexing note
215.
Mary Shaw, Bush Administration Defies the U.N. Committee on Torture, OPEDNEWS.COM (Nov. 12,
The
Bush
2007),
http://www.opednews.com/articles/opedne marysha_071112_bush administration.htm.
Administration responded to the 2006 Report in the same manner as the follow-up from the U.N.'s Committee on
Torture Inquiry in 2007, a repeat of the denial of wrongdoing. Id.
UNCHR Report of 2006, supra note 202, at 53-54, Annex 11 (letter from Kevin Edward Moley,
216.
Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the United States of America dated January 31, 2006 addressed to
the office of the UN High Commissioner).
217.
Warren Hoge, U.N. Report Calls for End to Guantanamo Detentions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/16/intemational/1 6cnd-gitmo.html.
See generally Eur. Consult. Ass., Secret Detentions and Illegal Transfers of Detainees Involving
218.
Council of Europe Member States: Second Report, Doc. No. 11302 (2007) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur's
Second Report on Detentions & Illegal Transfers 2007], available at http://www.assembly.coe.int/
Documents/WorkingDocs/DocO7/edoc 11302.pdf.
219.
Id. at 25-31. An interesting aspect to calling the relationship with Poland and Romania are the
implications to The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in which the United States plays a key role and upon
which certain member states are dependent on inclusion within its framework. Id. The other significance to this
passage in the Report is the identification of the locations in Poland and Romania as "CIA black sites." Id.
220.
Id. at 48-50. As the special Rapporteur Report notes, the McCain amendment to the Detainee
Treatment Act was to be relatively short lived because "President Bush said that his "constitutional authority" as
Commander in Chief took precedence in "protecting the American people from further terrorist attacks" thus
allowing him to pursue the same practices. Id
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to that Report's extensive content, which the complicit European Union member
states could not avoid. 22 1
The United Nations, however, did not stop with the efforts expressed in their
2006 Report. The recent 2010 effort led by Manfred Nowak, focusing on essential
civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, included the issues of rendition
and detention.222 Central to the theme of the UNCHR 2010 Report was
documentation of the significantly increased use of secret detentions with the
advent of the global war on terrorism, which caused the study of the United States
practices since the attack of September 11, 2001 .223 The Report concludes that the
"wide use of states of emergency, international wars in the fight against terrorism"
and other similar justifications as predicates for secret detention and "extraordinary
[are] conferred on authorities including Armed Forces, law
powers . . .
enforcement bodies and or intelligence agencies . . . always in 'global war'

paradigms."2 24
The 2010 UNCHR Report graphically chronicled the capture and obvious
rendition of citizens from: Kuwait, Tanzania, Indonesia, Yemen, Germany,
Pakistan, Jordan and Tunis to name a few, to other locations where they were
subjected to detention and torture.225 The report was provided to United States
officials, who responded to the Committee's questions regarding the CAT to the
effect that:
The United States does not transfer persons to countries where the
United States believes it is "more likely than not" that they will be
tortured ... and United States obtains assurances, as appropriate,
from the foreign government to which a detainee is transferred that
he will not torture the individual being transferred.2 26
The 2010 UNCHR Report documented Italy's report of the first convictions of
CIA and foreign agents-in absentia-for the rendition and secret detention
program for the abduction of two Egyptian nationals from the streets of Milan,
Italy in 2003.227 The Italian Court of Appeals ultimately upheld sentences ranging
Special Rapporteur's Second Report on Detentions & Illegal Transfers 2007, supra note 218, at 2-3.
221.
222.
U.N. Human Rights Council, Promotion and Prot. of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Econ., Social
and Cultural Rights, Including The Right To Dev., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/42 19 (Feb. 2010) [hereinafter UNCHR
Report of 2010], available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/1 3session/A-HRC-1 3-42.pdf.
223.
Id. at 2 3. Another surprising finding in the conference report is that "in almost no recent cases have
there been any judicial investigations into the allegations of secret detention, and practically no one has been
brought to justice." Id. at 5. It cannot be seen uniquely as a United States problem, but one of global dimensions
given the perception of the fight against global terrorism. Id
224.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 60-64. In another case documented in this report, two men were "seized in the former Soviet
225.
State of Georgia in early 2002 and sold to United States forces" after which they remained in GuantAnamo for
several years. Id. at 65-66.
CAT/C/48/Add.3/Ref.1, para. 30 as referenced in UNCHR Report of 2010, supra note 222, at 69-70.
226.
European Parliament, Directorate-General External Policies, Policy Department, Workshop Torture
227.
and Secret Detentions: The U.N. Perspective and the Role of the European Union 2011, at 11-12. Unfortunately
the Italian government was able to effectively assert its own state secrets law to prevent the conviction of five
Italian security agents who had worked with the CIA operatives in the kidnap and detention. Id. at 12.
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from seven to nine years for the CIA agents who had participated in this
kidnapping of Egyptian citizens in Italy. 228 The full capacity of the EU to
investigate the secret detention facilities was most recently reported to be
compromised by the fact that a decision by the United States District Court of the
District of Columbia ruled in favor of the United States government on the
disclosure of documents to the European Union under Freedom Of Information Act
request (FOI), a determination based on the government's argument that there was
no obligation to accept requests from foreign government entities.229

IX.

THE MEASURES OF CONTINUED IMPUNITY

A. The Obama Administration
In January 2009, the Obama Administration assumed the presidency with
considerable fanfare and pronouncements about adhering to our international
obligations and identified one major goal: to "[close] Guantanamo within one
year." 23 0 President Obama issued an executive order in January of 2009 that
reaffirmed the United States adherence to the Army Field Manual, Geneva
Conventions and other international law as it related to detainees and
interrogation.23' In furtherance of those goals, an April 2009 DOJ order suspended
four of the dozens of prior DOJ OLC written opinions that provided the legal
authority to the CIA to conduct torture during the Bush Administration.2 32 On June
11, 2009 a broader order from the Justice Department invalidated all of the OLC
legal opinions from September 11, 2001 to January 20, 2009, formalized in another
memorandum for the Attorney General authored by David J. Barron.233
President Obama's desire to close Guantinamo was unsuccessful because he
did not anticipate the fierce opposition from the House of Representatives to the
closure of Guantinamo as it would require the transfer of terroristdetainees back
to the United States. 2 34 Congressional refusal to fund the detainees' transfers forced

228.
Id. at 11-12.
229.
All Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition v. U.S. Dept. of Def., 851 F. Supp. 2d 169,
176 (D.D.C. 2012) These FOIA requests were made by the British Parliamentary group seeking to obtain
documents showing CIA involvement with the British govemment in the areas of rendition and perpetration of
torture. See U.N. News Service, U.N. Expert Regrets US Court Decision Preventing Oversight of Intelligence
Services (Apr. 12, 2012), available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/printnews/Ar.asp?nid-41765.
230.
Jeremy Herb, Obama Promise to Close Guantdnamo Prison Unfulfilled, THE HILL (Jan. 11, 2012),
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/203727-obama-promise-to-close-prison-at-guantanamo-stillunfulfilled (noting unfulfilled pre-election promise to close Guantinamo within one year).
231.
Exec. Order No. 13491, 74 FED. REG. 4893 (Jan. 27, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/ensuring-lawful-interrogations.
232.
Memorandum for the Att'y Gen. by David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., Withdrawal of
Office
of Legal
Counsel
CIA
Interrogation
Opinion
(Apr.
15,
2009),
available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/withdraw-0409.pdf.
233.
Memorandum for Att'y Gen. from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., Withdrawal of Office
of Legal Counsel Opinions (June I1, 2009), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/withdraw0609.pdf.
234.
Peter Landers, Congress Bars Gitmo Transfers, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 23, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SBl00014.html. Congress initially used rulemaking authority followed by a provision

https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol18/iss1/4

32

: Enhancing Impunity
Fall 2012

Enhancing Impunity

119

President Obama to back away from his promise to close Guantinamo, and in
March of 2011 he was compelled to resurrect the failed Guantdnamo military
commissions that had been suspended since he took office in January 2009.235
The failure to press for closure of Guantanamo is perplexing. The President
was empowered as Commander-In-Chief of the Armed Forces in time of war or
conflict and, given the broad parameters of interpretations of that power under the
AUMF by his predecessor, he was in a position to assert those powers to close
Guantinamo and transfer the prisoners to wherever he desired.236 He might have
pressed the unequivocal jurisdiction of the United States Courts under Article III as
a place to bring the charges against terrorists (civilians) for acts that had significant
effects in the United States.237 The prior successful prosecutions of terrorists in the
United States in the federal courts included those who were involved in the 1993
attacks on the New York City Twin Towers and other notorious terroristssuccessful prosecutions that would tend to blunt congressional criticism of housing
suspected terrorists in the United States prison system or using the courts, which
had already been successfully accomplished in a number of cases.238
Another failure was not pursuing full investigations for determinations of
criminal conduct involving those who actually planned, executed, or perpetrated
cruel and inhuman torture on any detainees-a step that would have placed the
United States in compliance with both domestic and international law addressed
here.239 Instead, early in his administration President Obama essentially immunized
the CIA and other personnel with his assurance in the April 27, 2009 statement that
"those who carried out their duties in good faith upon legal advice from the
Department of Justice . . . would not be subject to prosecution." 240
in the "Defense Authorization Bill" that effectively precluded any funds available for transfers from Guantinamo
to the United States. Id.
235.
Exec. Order No. 13492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 22, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/closure-guantanamo-detention-facilities; Obama Orders Guantanamo
Tribunals to Resume. Is he Abandoning his Pledge?, CHRISTIAN SCIENTIST MONITOR (Mar. 7, 2011),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2011/0307/Obama-orders-Guantanamo-tribunals-to-resume.-Is-heabandoning-his-pledge.
236.
U.S. CONST. art 11,§ 2; TODD B. TATELMAN, GONG. RESEARCH SERV., Supreme Court Nominee Elena
Kagan: Presidential Authority and the Separation of Powers (2010), available at http://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/misc/R41272.pdf.
237.
U.S. CONST, art Ill, §§ 1-2; United States v. Rahman, 189 F. 3d 88 (2d Cir. 1999).
238.
U.S. Department of Justice, Fact Sheet: Prosecuting And Detaining Terrorist Suspects in The US
Criminal Justice System, Major Historical Cases In SDNY, June 4, 2009, available at:
http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/2009/June/09-ag-564.html (confirming the 1996 successful conviction in federal
court of the Blind Sheikh Rahman and six others for the 1993 bombing attack on the World Trade Center and
documenting other successful efforts against other terrorists).
239.
Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 28; ICCPR supra note 30, at art. 2.3 (a-c). In the case of the
ICCPR, the signing statement Resolution of Advice and Consent on the ICCPR in 1992 contained this language:
[T]he US understands the right to compensation referred to in Articles 9(5) and 14(6) to
require the provision of effective and enforceable mechanisms by which a victim of an
unlawful arrest or detention or miscarriage of justice of justice may seek and, where
justified, obtain compensation from either the responsible or the appropriate government
entity.
Id.
240.
Mark Benjamin, Obama Exempts CIA "Torture" Staff, BBC NEWS (Apr. 17, 2009),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8003537.stm (noting that the President did not specifically say it would include those
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Attorney General Eric Holder referred the matter of just two detainee deaths
occurring in CIA custody to Assistant United States Attorney John Durham to
identify those individuals who might be subject to further investigation or
considered for possible prosecution, despite the nearly one hundred or so other
detainees who died in United States custody or as a result of interrogations or other
acts, matters which were foreclosed. 24 1 Durham was previously appointed during
the Bush Administration to investigate the infamous destruction of dozens of
seventy-two CIA tape recordings of extreme interrogations, which had been
ordered preserved for possible congressional hearings, but were destroyed by a
CIA official.242 In that case, Durham determined that the individual who destroyed
the tapes did so contrary to specific orders that they be preserved, but neither he
nor Holder found a basis for further discipline or any criminal charges against
him. 24 3 There is no surprise that Durham's much-delayed investigation of the CIA's
complicity in the deaths of the two detainees eventually determined-Holder in
accord-no basis for further investigations that might lead to prosecution of any
CIA officials. 24
The DOJ's Inspector General's Office of Professional Responsibility (DOJ
OPR Report) completed a lengthy investigation into the OLC reports of Yoo and
Bybee that resulted in conclusions that strongly discredited those opinions as
substantially flawed and failing to reflect an accurate statement of the law or its
application to the detainees.245 Despite the findings, the DOJ OPR Report made no
recommendation for any further action against the opinions' authors, even given
the consideration that they had legitimized and in some cases encouraged the
conduct by military and CIA personnel that amounted to gross violations of both
international and domestic law.246 This provided immunity from responsibility for
wrongdoing that would not be addressed beyond the administrative
investigations. 247 At other times in history, lawyers and officials in another state's
Justice Department did not fare quite so well in post-conflict settings where their
actions and opinions had caused serious harm and even death to captives, resulting
who "acted outside the boundaries laid out in the memos, or to those non-CIA staff involved in approving
interrogation limits").
241.
Andrew Ramonas, Holder To Appoint Torture Prosecutor,MAIN JUSTICE AND THE LAW (Aug. 24,
2009), http://www.mainjustice.com/2009/08/24/holder-to-bring-on-prosecutor-to-probe-harsh-interrogations/pint/
(describing that it would take nearly two years for John Durham to investigate the matter involving nearly one
hundred instances of suspected torture to determine that there is no wrongdoing).
242.
Alana Goodman, Topic: Special ProsecutorWH Needs Special ProsecutorNow, THE DISSENTER (June
29, 2010), http://dissenter.firedoglake.com/2011/08/01/judge-sanctions-cia-for-destruction-of-interrogation-tapes
(noting that the DOJ closed the case after his report found no basis for further inquiry).
243.
Id.; Kevin Goztola, Judge Sanctions CIA for Destructionof InterrogationTapes, THE DISSENTER (Aug.
1, 2011), http://dissenter.firedoglake.com/2011/08/01/judge-sanctions-cia-for-destruction-of-interrogation-tapes.
244.
Chris Strohm, Holder: Justice To Drop Investigations Into CIA Officials Involved In Torture, THE
NATIONAL JOURNAL (June 30, 2011), http://www.nationaljoumal.com/holder-justice-to-drop-investigations-intocia-officials-involved-in-torture-20110630 (noting that Holder informed Congress in 2012 "the investigations had
run their course and would be closed very soon"); Josh Gerstein, Holder: CIA Interrogation ProbeNearing End,
Politico, UNDER THE RADAR BLOG (Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2012/02/holdercia-interrogation-probe-nearing-end- 13313.html.
245.
DOJ-OPR Report, supra note 81, at 235-36.
246.
Id.
247.
Id
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in tribunal findings that they were guilty of war crimes and crimes against

humanity. 24 8
Another step taken by President Obama was his signing of an executive order
to create a formal system for indefinite detention for those held at Guantanamo.24 9
According to authors Peter Finn and Anne Kornblut, the order applies to fortyeight of the 172 detainees who were at Guantanamo at that time. 250 Conversely, the
DOJ is vigorously pursuing the prosecution of John Kiriakou, a former CIA officer
and author of his book, The Reluctant Spy: My Secret Life in the CIA's War on
Terror and articles that appeared in the New York Times, for having allegedly
disclosed classified information about the interrogation of one of the fourteen high25!
level detainees and other information, including the identify of a CIA operative.
X. THE CONSEQUENCES OF IMPUNITY PAST
A. The Nuremberg Judgment
World War I ended in 1918 after a conflict of incredible proportions of human
and property destruction as a result of degrading conduct perpetrated on both
combatants and civilians, but the epoch was marked by the absolute impunity of
the most senior officials who both commenced and conducted the hostilities. 252 The
difference between ignoring impunity in 1918 by the international community and
holding similar actors accountable for it in 1946 under the Nuremberg Principle is
quite dramatic.2 53 The Nuremberg Judgment defined the responsibility under War
Crimes for "violations of the laws or customs of war. . . including ill-treatment of
prisoners of war ... not justified by military necessity" and under Crimes Against
Humanity for "deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian
population

.

.

. whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country

where perpetrated." 254

Nuremberg Principle I states "any person who commits an

The Nuremberg Trials: The Justice Trial, United States of America v. Alstotter, 3 T.W.C. 1 (1948), 6
248.
L.R.T.W.C. 1 (1948), 14 ANN. DIG. 278 (1948). Conducts amounting to gross violations of human rights were
under consideration in these trials with the admonition that "judges should not be eager enlisters in popular
movements of the day, or allow themselves to become so immersed in a professional culture that they are
oblivious to the human consequences of their decisions." Id. at 5 (including the comments by Richard A. Posner).
249.
Peter Finn and Anne E. Komblut, Obama Creates Indefinite Detention System for Prisoners at
Guantanamo Bay, WASH. POST (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2011/03/07/AR201103070487 1.html.
Id.
250.
Former CIA Officer John Kiriakou Charged with Disclosing Covert Officer's Identity and Other
251.
Classified Information to Journalists and Lying to CIA's Publications Review Board, Office of Public Affairs,
U.S. DEP'TOF JUSTICE (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/January/12-ag-083.html.
Mary Margaret Penrose, The Emperor's Clothes: Evaluating Head of State Immunity under
252.
InternationalLaw, 7 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 85, 99-101 (2010). The Kaiser escaped despite "the promise in the
Treaty of Versailles, unequivocally asserted they would prosecute Kaiser Wilhelm II." Id. at 100.
253.

ADAM ROGERS & RICHARD GUELLF, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 175-76 (3d ed. 2005). The

authors' prefatory note to the 1946 Judgment of the International Military Tribunal At Nuremberg that stated that
"the Nuremberg tribunal focused attention on many issues of central importance to the application of the laws of
war, including the responsibility of individuals to observe international laws 'together with' the question of
obedience to superior orders." Id.
Id. at 177 (Judgment at Nuremberg extracts, the Charter provisions under article 6 of the Charter).
254.
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act that constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefore liable to
punishment" and Principle III declares that "the fact that the person is a head of
state to responsible government official does not relieve him from responsibility
under international law." 255 Furthermore, under Nuremberg's Principle IV, the fact
that an accused was "acting pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior
does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a moral
choice was in fact possible to him." 2 56
The Nuremberg Judgment held for an individual's responsibility for war
crimes and crimes against humanity applicable equally to cases of torture or
rendition, thus its judgment repudiates acting with impunity for these gross
violations of international law. 25 7 The Nuremberg Principles were then embodied in
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), The Geneva Conventions of
1949 and its Additional Protocol I, Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Geneva 1949, Protocol I), and the ICCPR. 258 This
body of international instruments delineates the obligations for any individual,
including the heads of state or other high-level government officials, in cases
involving humanitarian or human rights law.259
B. The Ongoing European Union Concerns
In July 2006, the Organization For Security And Cooperation In Europe
(OSCE) met in Brussels and as part of its resolutions for that meeting, addressed
the rise of the unlawful practices of rendition in the wake of the war on terrorism
that appeared to "violate most fundamental human rights and freedoms and are
contrary to intemational human rights treaties which form the cornerstone of the
post-World War II human rights protection." 260 The earlier referenced UNCHR
2006 Report noted the "consistent reports about the practice of rendition and
forcible return of Guantinamo detainees to countries where they were at risk of
torture," including European Union member states. 261
The OSCE's efforts gained momentum at that time, after which the
organization went a step further through its Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA)
and demanded that OSCE member states promptly and thoroughly investigate all
255.
See PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW RECOGNIZED IN THE CHARTER OF THE NUREMBERG
TRIBUNAL AND IN THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIBUNAL, 1950 GAOR, 3d Sess. Supp. No 12 (A/1316), Principles I

and Ill.
256.
257.

Id. at Principle IV.
ROGERS & GUELLF, supra note 252.

258.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948; U.S. G.A. Res. 217A, 3 U.N. GAOR, U.N. doc. A/810,
at 71 (1948), available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr; CAT, supra note 29; ICCPR, supra note 30;
Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 28; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts [hereinafter Protocol 1]; 1125 U.N.T.S.
(1979) 3-608; 16 I.L.M. 1391-441 (Eng.). The United States is not a party to Protocol 1, however its provisions,
and particularly article 75, provide the fundamental guarantees that preclude torture of all kinds whether physical
or mental and outrages upon personal dignity. Id at art. 75.
259.
Protocol 1,supra note 258.
260.
Brussels Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and Resolutions Adopted at the 15th
Annual Session, Brussels, Report of July 3-7, 2006, at 40 [hereinafter OSCE Report of July 2006].
261.
UNCHR Report of 2006, supranote 202, at 18.
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allegations that "their territory has been used to assist CIA chartered flights secretly
transporting detainees to countries where they may be subject to disappearance,
torture or other ill-treatment." 26 2 The OSCE Report of July 2006, cited earlier,
specifically called on the United States to "reconsider its position in relationship to
the usefulness of detaining prisoners in this way and the contribution this is making
to the common struggle against terrorist acts." 26 3 These practices were viewed to
"violate the most fundamental human rights and freedoms that are contrary to
international human rights treaties which form the cornerstone of the Post World
War II human rights protections." 2 64 The United States is one of fifty-six member
states of OSCE, participates in its PA and its delegates have held positions as high
as the organization's presidency in previous years. 265 In the period following the
OSCE Brussels Declaration of July 2006, the United States refused to cooperate
with the investigations required by paragraphs twenty-five or twenty-six of the
PA's mandate.2 66
The Congressional Research Service report published in May 2012 for
Congress confirmed the escalation of ongoing differences between the United
States and the EU over "terrorist detainee policies and practices" including the
practices of rendition, and was coupled with the failure of the Obama
Administration to close the Guantinamo detention facility.267 The efforts to mute
the issue on the domestic front by suspending legal opinions, renouncing torture
and rendition, closing investigations into deaths of detainees or immunizing the
CIA is unlikely to satisfy the United Nations or the European Union communities,
including OSCE, because their official organs do not intend to cease the efforts to
fully investigate all aspects of rendition involving the United States and the CIA
that directly involved their member states. Romania's complicity requires that it
may face a European Union High Court challenge over its involvement in detention
and torture of a detainee, al-Nashiri, in cooperation with the CIA.268 This comes on
the heels of an EU Committee to Prevent Torture (CPT) November 2011 report
that focused in part on Romania's cooperation with the United States CIA in
detention and torture of United States captives.269
262.
263.
264.

265.

OSCE Report of July 2006, supra note 260, at 42 1125.
Id. at 42 1126.
UNCHR Report of 2006, supra note 202, at 18.
Who we are and what we do, ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION INEUROPE (OSCE),

http://www.osce.org/who; http://www.osce.org/what (last visited Feb. 26, 2013).

266.
OSCE Report of July 2006, supra note 260, at 42, 1125 & 26.
267.
Kristen Archick, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S.-E.U. Cooperation Against Terrorism, (2002) 17-18. In
a footnote to her paper Ms. Archick identifies multiple problems which are the cause of that friction, which
include the "EU Investigation of CIA Flights May Threaten Intelligence Cooperation," which she quoted from an
Associated Press, February 28, 2007 article. Id. at 18, n.37.
268.
Romania Faces European Court Challenge over CIA Basement Prison, OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATION
(Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.soros.org/press-releases/romania-faces-european-court-challenge-over-cia-basementprison. "[T]he EU high court is being asked to address Romania's involvement in the torture and detention," an
inquiry that could directly affect Romania's difficulties post-accession to the EU to ensure fulfillment of its human
rights obligations. Id
269.
Council of Europe Anti-Torture Committee visits Romania, Council of Europe, EUROPEAN COMMITTEE
TO FOR THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE (CPT) (Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.cpt.coe.int/documents/romi/2010-09-23eng.htm. "[T]he delegation had a meeting with ... Vice President of the Senate in order to discuss the issue of the
alleged existence . . . of secret detention facilities on Romanian territory operated by the Central Intelligence
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The United Nations Special Rapporteur's Report of 2007 similarly documented
the infamous case of Khalid El-Masri, a German citizen, who was detained for
twenty-three days while on vacation at the Macedonian border in 2006 by its
security forces, and then forcibly transferred to the custody of the CIA, where he
was then renditioned to Kabul, Afghanistan and held for several months before
being released in a remote location in Albania. 27 0 During this detention at a CIA
"black site," El-Masri was subjected to harsh interrogation and torture, despite his
protestations that he was not the terrorist the CIA was seeking. 2 7' His subsequent
claims for reparations or compensation were foreclosed in the federal courts and
denied a hearing by the United States Supreme Court; however, El-Masri's case
was filed against Macedonia for the acts of their security forces and recently heard
in Strasbourg by seventeen justices of the European Court Of Human Rights in
May, 2012, which resulted in a favorable decision by the justices of this tribunal
that awarded him damages for the wrong conduct.272 The El-Masri federal case
decision typifies the result in almost all other post 9/11 detainee claims brought
before him in the United States federal courts. 273 Most of those cases have been
dismissed on multiple grounds that often include the "States Secrets Doctrine,"
which effectively prevents the pursuit of the claimant's action because it will
require disclosure of "state secrets,"274 but is somewhat surprising because Holder
supposedly imposed new limits on the government assertion of the state secrets
privilege in September 2009.275
This government action thwarting the required action remains incompatible
with the obligations of the United States under ICCPR and CAT, together with the
generally recognized obligations of "state responsibility" under contemporary

Agency (CIA) of the United States." Id. The full report of this visit is in published in 2011 French, but could not
be translated for this paper.
270.
Special Rapporteur's Second Report on Detentions & Illegal Transfers 2007, supra note 218, at 49-51.
Mr. El Masri's case filed against CIA officials were summarily dismissed in the United States federal court system
based primarily on the successful assertion of the "State Secrets Doctrine," which has successfully thwarted the
claims of numerous other detainees who were either tortured, rendition or both for which they unsuccessfully
attempted to seek compensation or reparations for the wrongs perpetrated by US authorities. Id. at 51-55; El-Masri
v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 301 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied 552 U.S. 947 (2007).
271.
Special Rapporteur's Second Report on Detentions & Illegal Transfers 2007, supra note 218.
272.
Sinisa lakov Marusic, StrasbourgHears Macedonia Rendition Case in Balkan Insight, (May 5 2012),
The United States is
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/strasbourg-scrutinizes-macadenia-in-rention-case.
not a member of the European Union or a party to the case so will not be affected by the outcome. El-Masri v. the
former Yugolslav Republic of Macedonia, Application no. 39630/09 (Eur. Ct., Dec. 13, 2012), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i-001 -115621 #{"itemid":["001 -115621 "]}.
273.
See Statement of Jamil Dakwar, Lack Of United States Accountability And Remedy For Tortures And
Abuse In The Name Of Counterterrorism, submitted to OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting at
Warsaw Poland, (Sept. 28, 2011), 4-6, available at http:/www.osce.org/odihr/83140.
274.
Id.
275.
See Charlie Savage, Justice Department to Limit Use of State Secrets Privilege, N. Y. TIMES (Sept. 23,
2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/23/us/politics/23secrets.html?r-l&pagewanted-print
(stating that a Justice Department Official asserted that there would be a "responsible use" of the privilege after the
change of policy); see Human Rights First Report Card January-Assessing the Obama Administration's Record
of Compliance with the Rule of Law and Human Rights in National Security Policy, 3.
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international law.276 Ian Brownlee expressed the principal of this obligation of a
state referring to the 1927 Massey case as follows:
I believe that it is undoubtedly a sound general principle that
wherever there is misconduct on the part of persons in state
service, whatever may be their particular status or rank under
domestic law, results in the failure of a nation to perform its
obligations under international law, then the nation's government
is obligated to accept responsibility for the wrongful acts of its
servants.277
Considering the ILC's Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
International Wrongful Acts, which includes the violations of international treaties,
agreements or conventions, provides the confirmation of the internationally
recognized responsibility of a state under international law that has been
thoroughly addressed in international jurisprudence. 27 8 The ILC's Article 31
Reparations states "1. The responsible state is under an obligation to make full
reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act; 2. Injury
includes any damage whether material or moral caused by the internationally
wrongful act of the state."279 As a general proposition, if each time a detainee who
is a victim of torture or rendition, or a combination of those two and harsh
interrogation, files a claim with the United States courts for reparations or
compensation based on violations of CAT, ICCPR, or our domestic law, only to
find that claim dismissed based on the assertions of the government to prevent the
victim from obtaining reparations or compensation, then the government must be
seen as continuing to act with impunity as to the enumerated obligations under
CAT and ICCPR.28 o When the government of any State, whether by its executive,
legislative and judicial branches, acts to systematically prevent the
claimant/victim's successful assertion of a rightful claim for reparations or
compensation as a consequence of torture or rendition, it expresses an impunity to
the basic international norms and obligations that have been repeatedly identified

276.
ICCPR, supra note 30, at arts. 9, 14; CAT, supra note 29; see Int'l Law Commission Draft Articles of
State Responsibility, 2001.
277.

IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 432-33 (Oxford, 2003). Massey involves

a claim by the United States against Mexico "based on their failure to take action to punish the killer of an
American citizen who was working in that country." Id.; see RIAA iv. 153 (1927) (referring to the action on behalf
of the widow of the decedent).
278.
See Simon Olleson, The Impact of The ILC's Articles on Responsibility of States for International
Wrongful Acts, BRIT. INST. INT'L & COMP. L. 191-93 (2011), available at http://www.biicl.org/files/3107 impact
ofthearticlesonstate responsibilitypreliminarydraftfinal.pdf.
279.
ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), art. 31(5).
280.
ICCPR,supra note 30, art. 31; CAT, supra note 29, art. 14; Alien's Action for Tort, 28 U.S.C. § 1350,
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-265, 106 Stat. 73 (1992); see Eric Engle, The Torture
Victims' ProtectionAct, The Alien Tort Claims Act, and FoucaultsArchaeology of Knowledge, 67 ALB. L. REV.,
501, 504-10 (2004) (delineating the obstacles to presenting a successful claim under either of the latter footnoted
U.S. legislation, which has been the case for any detainee who have attempted to invoke these laws or other
grounds).
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in this paper.28 1 The previously referenced "signing statement" by the United States
to the ICCPR in 1992 specifically addressed the requirements for "effective and
enforceable mechanisms by which a victim of an unlawful arrest or detention or
miscarriage of justice may seek, and where justified, obtain compensation," but the
current practice amounts to nothing more than a stark repudiation of those
obligations-"acting with impunity."282
XI. CONCLUSIONS: THE CONTINUED COURSE OF IMPUNITY

The current administration's record confirms that it finds itself unable to detach
from at least some of the practices of the prior administration, and is now also
obligated to defend them. Providing "immunity" for all officials demonstrates
impunity to the requirement for holding individuals responsible for violation of
international conventions and treaties to which the United States is a party.2 83 The
United States Congress has shown no interest to further efforts related to any
compensation for torture or rendition of the detainees beyond the Senate Report of
2008.284 The fact that the Obama Administration avoided its obligation to provide
such compensation or reparations to any detainees under international law
principles or domestic law-aided by United States court decisions closing the
door on those claims-continues to conflict with the expressly signed statement to
the ICCPR that recognized an obligation.2 85 The ongoing conduct of indefinite
detention, selective rendition and the military commission trials at Guantinamo
remain the benchmarks of this continuum. The actions of the UNCHR, OCSEand even in other states in the case of trials of CIA operatives in absentia in
Italy-may occur, but with no appreciable effect on the current United States
practices toward detainees, but may serve as a precursor to change during
succeeding administrations with the continuance of the war on terror. The
immunity provided for officials and actors in the matter of torture and rendition
will stand based on the recognized "function of immunity . .. to privilege certain
voices and silence others," suggested by authors Charles and Chinkin.286 The
conclusion here may conflict with the ideas expressed by Epstein and his
colleagues regarding the courts and civil liberties in times of crises, but the war on
terror is significantly different. The more precise models of the World War II
paradigm may be less applicable to post-conflict change in a State's court handling
of detainees' reparations cases in cases of detainees during a "war on terror,", but

281.
ICCPR, supra note 30, at art. 31; CAT, supra note 29, at art. 9, at 14; Geneva Conventions of 1949 Ill,
supranote 28.
282.
ICCPR, supranote 30, at art. 31.
283.
CAT, supra note 29, at art. 12; ICCPR, supra note 30, at arts. 2(3)(a-c) (relative to duties to investigate
and enforce the instruments obligations in cases of violations).
284.
HOUSE REPORT OF 2008, supranote 4.
285.
ICCPR, supra note 30.
286.
HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
FEMINIST ANALYSIS 125 (3d ed. 2000).
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this serves as no justification for the United States' continued impunity respecting
its core international obligations in during the ongoing conflict. 2 8 7

War, at 50-54, NYU.EDU,
The Supreme Silence During
et al.,
Lee Epstein
287.
http://www.nyu.edulclasses/nbeck/q2/king.propensity.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2013); Getting Away with
Torture-the Bush Administration and Mistreatment of Detainees, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 67-70 (July, 2011),
available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usO7llwebwcover.pdf (confirming that no U.S. court
case has resulted in an award for any post 9/11 detainee who was a victim of torture).
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